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Since the advent of nuclear power in the United States in the mid-20th 
century, the federal government has struggled to find a suitable location to 
store the hazardous waste associated with nuclear power generation.  In 
1991, in an attempt to solve the problem of storing nuclear waste, the 
federal government created grant programs which offered funding to states 
and Native American tribes who volunteered to store nuclear waste on their 
lands.  One tribe in particular, the Skull Valley Goshute of Utah, viewed 
storing nuclear waste as an opportunity to infuse their reservation with 
monies.  Further, because tribes enjoy sovereign status in the United States, 
the Goshute believed their application could overcome state and federal 
opposition.  However, the Goshute’s application to store nuclear waste on 
their reservation was denied by the federal government which used its 
powers under the Federal Trust Doctrine to rule that storing nuclear waste 
on the Goshute reservation would adversely affect the health and well-bring 
of the Goshute tribe. 
This Note explores the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine 
and tribal sovereignty and how the Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) handled this conflict in the siting of cellular towers on Native 
American land.  Further, a proposal for a nuclear waste facility siting 
system based on the FCC’s Cellular Tower Construction Notification 
System is presented as a solution to the United States’ nuclear waste 
storage problem.  This new siting system would allow tribes to enter in to 
lucrative contracts to store nuclear waste on their land while allowing the 
tribes to maintain their full sovereign rights.  In order for this new siting 
system to work, the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine and tribal 
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sovereignty must be reconciled by acknowledging that tribes have full self-
determination limited only by externality moderations approved by the 
tribes.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
In the spring of 2009, President Barack Obama ceased almost all 
funding for the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Repository Project in Nye County 
Nevada.
1
  The President’s decision ended a twenty-two year debate 
                                                 
 1. See Editorial, Mountain of Trouble: Mr. Obama Defunds the Nuclear Repository 
at Yucca Mountain.  Now What?, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2009, at A18, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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concerning where the United States’ nuclear waste should be stored 
permanently and safely.
2
  As of 2008, the United States had 56,000 metric 
tons of nuclear waste, an amount expected to more than double by the year 
2035.
3
  Currently, that nuclear waste is stored in thirty-nine states across the 
country in more than 121 facilities.
4
  As the country’s amount of nuclear 
waste continues to grow, the need for long-term storage facilities becomes 
more critical.  While the federal government searches for solutions to our 
country’s nuclear waste problem, there is a group of people who, in the 
past, have shown a willingness to site nuclear waste on their land:  Native 
Americans.   
After centuries of cultural oppression, many Native Americans have 
left their reservations to live in cities and towns across the country.
5
  Tribal 
members who have chosen to stay on reservations live on remote pockets of 
land across the United States.
6
  Most of the land—far removed from centers 
of human economic activity—has very little value,
7
 and the majority of the 
Native American population lives in extreme poverty.
8
  Tribal leaders are 
left with the unenviable task of finding commercial ventures to sustain the 
current and future tribal population.
9
   
                                                                                                                 
dyn/content/article/2009/03/07/AR2009030701666.html [hereinafter Mountain of Trouble] 
("President Obama has succeeded in killing the contentious project that remains unfinished 
22 years after Congress selected the site.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 2. See id. (explaining the debate in Congress over where to locate nuclear waste and 
the President's final decision to take the Yucca Mountain option off of the table). 
 3. See Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads:  Reconciling Native Sovereignty 
and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 331 (2009) ("[A]s of April 2008, the United 
States had stockpiled over 56,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, an amount predicted to 
increase to 119,000 metric tons by 2035."). 
 4. See Mountain of Trouble, supra note 1 ("[S]torage is spread over 121 above-
ground sites located within 75 miles of more than 161 million people in 39 states."). 
 5. See Eric J. Lacey, Manifest Destiny’s New Face:  “Soft-Selling” Tribal Heritage 
Lands for Toxic Waste, 92 GEO. L.J. 405, 405–08 (2004) (illustrating the greater problem of 
Native Americans being forced to sell their lands by narrating the plight of the Shoshone-
Bannock, a tribe that left the Fort Hall Indian Reservation and settled in rural Pocatello, 
Idaho). 
 6. See id. at 425 (noting the economic isolation of tribal land, due in part to their 
"remoteness and seclusion"). 
 7. See id. (noting the usefulness of the land has been diminished by the isolation of 
the land, pollution, and overuse). 
 8. See M.V. Gowda & Doug Easterling, Nuclear Waste and Native America:  The 
MRS Siting Exercise, 9 RISK 229, 246 (1998) ("According to the 1990 census, 50.7% of 
Native Americans living on reservations have incomes below the federal poverty level."). 
 9. See Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A 
Paradoxical Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. 267, 319–21 (1994) (stating that tribes must continually 
search for potential sources of economic development in order to merely sustain self-
sufficiency). 
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One venture that tribal leaders have considered is creating monitored 
retrievable storage (MRS) facilities to store nuclear waste on their lands.
10
  
Objections to such facilities have come from both neighboring non-Native 
American populations and members of the tribes themselves.  Tribal 
members opposed to MRS facilities argue that the economic benefit from 
siting this type of facility on their land is illusory and the danger of storing 
nuclear waste outweighs any economic benefits.
11
  Tribe members in favor 
of nuclear waste storage argue that the economic benefits tribes would 
receive would provide economic strength to reservations and produce funds 
for education, healthcare, and jobs for future generations.
12
  Further, 
proponents of storing nuclear waste argue that the nuclear waste trade can 
potentially attract other industries, which can further boost the tribe’s 




Regardless of the arguments for allowing or rejecting nuclear waste 
facilities on their reservations, determining which government entities have 
jurisdiction over tribes and reconciling the conflict between Native 
American sovereignty and the Federal Trust Doctrine are essential for 
creating a system that would allow tribes to voluntarily site nuclear waste 
storage facilities on their tribal land.  Currently the federal government has 
asserted primary authority and has sided with opponents:  officials have yet 
to approve a proposal for siting nuclear waste on tribal land.
14
 
Section II begins with the history of nuclear power regulation to show 
how nuclear waste siting regulations have evolved to their current state.  
Next, a case study involving the Skull Valley Goshute tribe’s attempt to site 
nuclear waste on their land is presented to show why a new model is 
necessary to resolve the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine and 
tribal sovereignty. 
                                                 
 10. See id. at 270 ("Native American nations must balance the potential economic 
benefits of the waste trade against the potential environmental harm of nuclear waste 
storage."); see also id. at 287 (explaining the MRS facility). 
 11. See id. at 275 (stating that some Native American leaders see the MRS projects as 
merely another "big promise[]" from the federal government that will be "ecologically 
disastrous" for the reservations and that the Native American people "won't ever see a dime 
from it" (quoting Margaret L. Knox, Their Mother’s Keeper, SIERRA, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 
57)). 
 12. See Collins, supra note 9, at 274–75 ("These are tools for self-determination and 
are necessary for tribes to escape economic domination by the U.S. government, to regain 
tribal power, and to preserve the tribe for future generations."). 
 13. See id. (noting that tribes rely on the federal government to supply them with 
funding necessary to tribal infrastructure and development). 
 14. See Davies, supra note 3, at 341–48 (listing various attempts to approve proposals 
for siting nuclear waste on tribal reservations). 
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Section III presents the history of federal and state jurisdiction powers 
over Native Americans to explain why the Federal Trust Doctrine has 
overpowered tribal sovereignty when tribes have tried to site nuclear waste 
facilities on their reservations. 
Section IV argues that cellular tower siting is similar to nuclear waste 
siting and therefore that cell tower siting procedures should be implemented 
for nuclear waste siting.  Then, historic preservation laws and the legislative 
history are presented to explain why cellular tower siting procedures have 
evolved to their present state. 
Section V discusses the problems that arise in trying to create a 
regulatory system for nuclear waste and goes on to propose that a new 
regulatory system, modeled on cellular tower siting procedures, should be 
created for nuclear waste. 
The paper concludes that Native American tribes should be allowed to 
exercise their sovereign powers and be allowed to practice full self-
determination, without challenges from the federal government or states, in 
deciding whether to site nuclear waste repositories on their reservations. 
 
II.  Nuclear Power in the United States 
 
In the mid-twentieth century, with the advent of nuclear power, 
federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction issues began to intensify.  Tensions 
began to rise soon after the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
15
 was passed and 
increased as the federal government began mining uranium on tribal lands.  
The government tapped civilian workers to mine and produce resources 
necessary for generating nuclear power, encouraged states to build nuclear 
power plants, pressured states and tribes to store nuclear waste as part of the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
16
 and later encouraged them to store nuclear 
waste in MRS facilities on their land.  These tensions are particularly clear 
in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute, who have spent years attempting to 
site nuclear waste on their land using MRS facilities.
17
   
 
A.  The Creation of Laws Governing Nuclear Power 
 
Prior to 1946, states and tribes had never been concerned with nuclear 
waste nor with uranium mining on their land, but in 1946, the federal 
                                                 
 15. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 70-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). 
 16. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2000)). 
 17. See infra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (describing the case of the Skull 
Valley Goshute). 
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government passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 that gave control of 
nuclear technology to the civilian-run Atomic Energy Commission.
18
  
Shortly after the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed, large deposits of 
uranium, the core ingredient in developing nuclear power, were discovered 
on many reservations.
19
  The federal government determined it was easiest 
and most cost-effective to mine the uranium on tribal lands, which they 
held in trust.
20
  The decision to mine uranium on tribal lands gave numerous 
jobs to tribe members, benefiting the tribes economically, but the impact on 
the environment was devastating.
21
  Native Americans were left occupying 
land surrounded by highly radioactive waste, which the federal government 
and private corporations made little effort to clean up.
22
 
A few years after mining began to intensify, Congress passed the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
23
 which developed the structure for how the 
nuclear industry operates.
24
  The main purpose of the Act was to encourage 
civilians to invest in nuclear power and to build nuclear power plants.
25
  
Further, the Act intended to "promote world peace, improve the general 
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in 
private enterprise."
26
  In order to further encourage private companies to 
build nuclear power plants, the Atomic Energy Commission promised to 
reprocess nuclear waste and planned to transport nuclear waste after it was 
removed from nuclear reactors.
27
  However, in 1974, Congress passed the 
                                                 
 18. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 70-85, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (legislating federal 
government ownership of all nuclear material and facilities, while civilians were limited to 
performing contract work for the government). 
 19. See Louis G. Leonard III, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environmental 
Justice in the Mescalero Apache’s Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 651, 655 (1997) ("The discovery of large uranium deposits on reservation lands in the 
1950's [sic] forced Native Americans to become unwilling participants in the experiment 
with nuclear power."). 
 20. See id. ("Because this land legally was held in trust by the federal government, it 
was the easiest and most economical for the government to mine."). 
 21. See id. ("[T]ribal members became the obvious choice for a labor force to staff the 
uranium mines.  These mining jobs were highly dangerous and often caused the 
contamination of an entire tribe or village."). 
 22. See id. ("[T]he federal government and private interests made little effort to clean 
up after themselves."). 
 23. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). 
 24. See Collins, supra note 9, at 277 ("[T]he Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . . . laid out 
the structure through which the nuclear industry operates today."). 
 25. See id. ("The 1954 Act encouraged civilian ownership of ‘both energy production 
and utilization facilities.’").  
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (1988)). 
 27. See Collins, supra note 9, at 277 ("The AEC initially planned to reprocess waste 
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Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
28
 which dissolved the Atomic Energy 
Commission and gave the Energy Research and Development 
Administration research and development responsibilities while bestowing 
regulatory and licensing functions on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC).
29
  Thus, the NRC became responsible for transporting and storing 
the United States’ nuclear waste. 
 
B.  The Federal Government’s Attempt at Nuclear Waste Siting 
 
Until the late 1970s, the federal government emphasized expanding 
nuclear power as quickly as possible with no regard to the environmental 
ramifications.
30
  The government failed to develop a plan for what to do 
with all the waste generated by mining, milling, and using uranium in the 
production of nuclear power.
31
  The failure to foresee the enormous amount 
of hazardous waste associated with nuclear power has created a serious 
ecological threat, which has been characterized by Congressman Edward 
Markey as, "the most potentially serious environmental hazard . . . fac[ing] 
the health and safety of people on this planet . . . for the next 10,000 
years . . . ."
32
   
Mounting nuclear waste led Congress to enact the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act (NWPA)
33
 in 1982, which had three key components.  The first 
component of the NWPA created a program to research and find permanent 
geologic structures that could be used to store nuclear waste.
34
  These 
repositories would be owned and operated by the federal government and 
                                                                                                                 
and promised utilities that nuclear waste would be transferred from utilities shortly after its 
removal from reactors.  In response to this federal initiative, many utilities built nuclear 
power plants."). 
 28. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5801, et seq.); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5879, 
2000(d) (specific sections of the Code changed by the 1974 Act). 
 29. See Collins, supra note 9, at 278 (explaining that the Energy Reorganization Act 
gave regulatory and licensing authority to the NRC and gave research and development 
responsibilities to the Energy Research and Development Administration). 
 30. See id. at 278–79 ("The buildup of uncontrolled nuclear waste resulted from a 
deliberate policy of the United States government . . . of emphasizing rapid expansion of 
nuclear power and de-emphasizing nuclear safety and health."). 
 31. See id. at 278 ("[T]he United States cavalierly mined, milled, and used uranium 
with no pre-planning for the safe disposal of the inevitable waste."). 
 32. 128 CONG. REC. 26,302 (1982) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
 33. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2000)). 
 34. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132 (outlining the requirements for candidate sites); see 
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131–10135 (2000) (laying out a structure by which new locations 
would be found in the United States for the purpose of storing nuclear waste). 
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funded by taxing nuclear power generation.
35
  The second component 
dictated that once the waste was taken to a federal repository, the 
government would take full ownership and responsibility for the storage of 
the waste.
36
  Third, the NWPA required the Department of Energy (DOE) 
to conduct a study regarding the use of MRS facilities, where nuclear waste 




In 1987, amendments were made to the NWPA, which directed the 
DOE to study one potential location for permanent nuclear waste storage:  
Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
38
  However, because Yucca Mountain was not 
going to be able to accept nuclear waste until after the year 2010, the 
government focused its attention on locations for MRS facilities to hold 




C.  Siting Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities 
 
The DOE believed MRS facilities were the short-term answer to the 
country’s nuclear waste storage problems because MRS facilities could 
store nuclear waste safely, with minimal impact to the environment and 
communities living near them.
40
  The DOE established three criteria for its 
first attempt at siting MRS facilities.  First, the DOE looked for locations on 
                                                 
 35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131 et seq. (establishing federal responsibility for the waste 
and spent fuel and funds for the selection of an appropriate storage site). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132 (recommending candidate sites and directing the Secretary 
of Energy to begin the study of candidate sites). 
 38. See Jon D. Erickson, Duane Chapman & Ronald E. Johnny, Monitored Retrievable 
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Indian Country: Liability, Sovereignty, and 
Socioeconomics, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 73, 76 (1994) ("After considering various locations 
for a repository, the 1987 Amendments to the NWPA (the 1987 Amendments) directed the 
[Department of Energy] to exclusively study the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada."); see also 
William La Jeunesse, Tracking Your Taxes: The High Price of Nuclear Waste, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/11/04/tracking-taxes-
high-price-nuclear-waste/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (noting that President Barack Obama 
has recently discontinued the Yucca Mountain project, meaning that siting of nuclear waste 
on tribal lands may gain a renewed interest)  (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 39. See Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 76 (noting the NWPA also authorized the 
DOE to "study and site both a repository for permanent disposal and an MRS facility for the 
purpose of temporary storage, consolidation, and repackaging of waste"). 
 40. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Dep’t of Energy, A Monitored 
Retrievable Storage Facility: Technical Background Information 6–8 (1991), available at 
http://www.energy.gov/media/Monitored_Retrievable_Storage_Background.pdf (outlining 
the simple functions MRS facilities will perform and predicting the minimal impact on the 
environs surrounding the MRS facilities). 




  Second, the locations had to be in the eastern half of the 
United States,
42
 where most nuclear waste is generated, and third, the site 
had to be at least 1100 acres and not near any operating reactors.
43
  Using 
these criteria, the DOE identified eleven possible MRS sites and focused on 
studying three located in Tennessee more extensively.
44
  The site they 
found that fit the criteria most perfectly was owned by the state of 
Tennessee, and in 1987 the DOE submitted its final proposal to Congress 
for the construction of a MRS facility there.
45
  However, the proposal was 
denied after strong opposition by the public and local government.
46
 
After this failed attempt, the DOE created the Nuclear Waste 
Negotiator position to facilitate MRS siting and adopted a new siting 
approach.
47
  The DOE decided to try to find a state or Native American 
tribe to voluntarily site a MRS facility on their land.
48
  In 1991, the DOE 
authorized a grant program in which the Nuclear Waste Negotiator invited 
                                                 
 41. Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Dep’t of Energy, Screening and 
Identification of Sited for a Proposed Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility 1–4 (1985) 
(DOE/RW-0023) [hereinafter Screening and Identification]. 
 42. See Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 77–79 (noting that the DOE originally 
wanted to site nuclear waste facilities in the eastern half of the United States to minimize the 
risks in transporting the waste; however, once the DOE concluded there were no suitable 
sites in the eastern half of the United States, this criterion was eliminated); see also 
SCREENING AND IDENTIFICATION, supra note 41, at 1 ("The eleven sites are located within a 
preferred geographic region where an MRS facility can significantly reduce spent fuel 
shipment miles and related impacts."). 
 43. See SCREENING AND IDENTIFICATION, supra note 41, at 1 ("Each site has at least 
1100 available acres without known land-use conflicts such as operating or planned 
commercial nuclear power plants."). 
 44. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Dep’t of Energy, 
Monitored Retrievable Storage Submission to Congress:  The Proposal 13–14 (1987) 
[hereinafter MRSS] (describing the selection process). 
 45. See id. at 13 ("Of the three candidate sites, the Clinch River site in the Roane 
County portion of Oak Ridge is recommended to the Congress as the preferred site . . . ."). 
 46. See 42 U.S.C. § 10162(a) (1988) (Subtitle C of the NWPA of 1982 amended) 
("The proposal . . . to locate a monitored retrievable storage facility . . . on the Clinch River 
in the Roane County portion of Oak Ridge . . . with alternative sites on the Oak Ridge 
Reservation . . . and on the former site of a proposed nuclear powerplant in Hartsville . . . is 
annulled and revoked."). 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10241–10251, 10242(b)(2) (NWPA of 1982 amended by Title 
IV) ("The Negotiator shall attempt to find a State or . . . tribe willing to host a repository or 
monitored retrievable storage facility at a technically qualified site on reasonable terms and 
shall negotiate with any State or Indian tribe which expresses [such] an interest . . . ."). 
 48. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
Preliminary Site Requirements and Considerations for a Monitored Retrievable Storage 
Facility iii (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Site Requirements],  available at 
http://www.energy.gov/media/MRS_Preliminary_Site_Requirements.pdf ("The Negotiator 
is to seek to negotiate a proposed agreement with a State or Indian Tribe willing to site an 
MRS facility at a technically qualified site."). 
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state governors and tribal leaders to request grants to be used to research the 
feasibility of constructing MRS facilities on their lands.
49
  The grant system 
was to last until 1993 and had three phases.
50
  Phase I offered $100,000 
grants for governors and tribes to do independent research on MRS 
facilities.
51
  Phase II-A offered $200,000 grants to continue research, and 
Phase II-B offered up to $2.8 million grants to fund educational outreach 
programs, to identify potential sites and begin environmental assessments, 
and to enter formal negotiations.
52
  After all of the studies were completed, 
tribes or governors could enter into negotiations with the DOE regarding 
the compensation for siting the MRS facility and procedures for operating 
the facility.
53
  By the time the application deadline for grants expired in 
1993, nine of the twelve Phase I grants were awarded to Native American 
tribes, all nine of the Phase II-A grant applications were made by tribes, and 
both Phase II-B grant applications were made by tribes.
54
  These statistics 
show that Native American tribes were the people willing to bear the 
burden of this nation’s nuclear waste.  One of those tribes was the Skull 




D.  The Skull Valley Goshute Tribe’s Efforts to Obtain a Nuclear Waste 
Facility 
 
The Goshute tribe was an ideal candidate to host MRS facilities 
because of their remote location in western Utah.
56
  The Goshute tribe has 
inhabited a desolate area in western Utah, known as Skull Valley, for more 
than 800 years, originally subsisting on small game and wild vegetables.
57
  
After Spanish missionaries and fur trappers came in contact with the 
Goshute, the missionaries urged travelers to take a different route West 
                                                 
 49. Office of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Negotiator, 1992 Annual Report to Congress 1–2 
(1993). 
 50. See Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 79–80 (explaining the chronological progress 
of the grant system). 
 51.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 80. 
 53. See id. ("Upon completion of feasibility studies, a tribe may then enter into formal 
negotiations with the DOE . . . [i]nclud[ing] details regarding the siting and operation of an 
MRS, as well as formulating compensation in the form of cash payments and benefits."). 
 54. Id. at 82. 
 55. See Davies, supra note 3, at 292, 332 (noting that a Goshute tribe member filed an 
application).  But see infra notes 79–84 and accompanying text (regarding environmental 
justice campaign led by Goshute tribe members in opposition to Leon Bear’s pursuit of 
nuclear waste disposal).  
 56. See id. at 295 (describing expansive Goshute territory in the Utah West Desert). 
 57. See generally id. at 294–95 (regarding traditional survival methods in the Goshute 
culture). 
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because the Goshute land was devoid of resources.
58
  After numerous 
conflicts with settlers in the area, the Goshute entered into a treaty with the 
United States in 1863 that allowed construction of military posts, mining 
facilities, and rail lines on their territory in exchange for $1,000 to be paid 
by the government every year for twenty years.
59
  A year later, the 
government tried to remove the Goshute from the area to make room for 
expanding military outposts and mining operations and relocate them to a 
reservation hundreds of miles to the East.
60
  However, the Goshute refused, 
arguing that the land belonged to their fathers and they had a right to stay 
there.
61
  After this attempt failed, and after another failed attempt to relocate 
them in 1871, the government gave up and mostly forgot about them.
62
  
Finally in 1911, an agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was sent to 
meet with the Goshute, and following the agent’s report, the government 
created an eighty-acre reservation in Skull Valley for the Goshute.
63
  A few 
years later, President Woodrow Wilson expanded the Skull Valley 
reservation to encompass 18,000 acres.
64
  In addition, the BIA set up a 
school and houses on the reservation.
65
  The influx of federal funding soon 
dried up, and by 1936 the BIA had ceased funding the Skull Valley 
Goshute, arguing that the tribe was too small to warrant government 
funding, and tried, again, to force the Goshute to move off of the land.
66
  
The tribe refused, and the BIA gave up for good.
67
  However, by the end of 
                                                 
 58. See DEAN L. MAY, UTAH:  A PEOPLE’S HISTORY 24 (1987) (describing Spaniards’ 
expedition through Utah in search of easily passable route to California); see also id. at 28 
(explaining the inventive survival methods of the Goshute in a harsh desert environment). 
 59. Davies, supra note 3, at 300 (summarizing the terms of the treaty). 
 60. See id. at 301 (addressing various strategies for removing the Goshute). 
 61. See id. (concerning struggles between the Goshute and the federal government of 
the United States); see also Steven J. Crum, The Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Tribe—
Deeply Attached to Their Native Homeland, 55 UTAH HIST. Q. 250, 251–52 (1987) (evoking 
Goshute cultural heritage and connection to the landscape). 
 62. See Davies, supra note 3, at 301–02 (recounting government efforts to remove the 
Goshute in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
 63. Id. at 302;  Exec. Order No. 1539 (May 29, 1912), reprinted in Executive Orders 
Relating to Indian Reservations 1855–1922, at 168 (1975) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 64. Exec. Order No. 2699 (Sept. 7, 1917), reprinted in 4 Indian Affairs:  Laws and 
Treaties 1049 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1929) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment); Exec. Order No. 2809 (Feb. 15, 1918), reprinted in 
4 Indian Affairs:  Laws and Treaties 1049 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1929) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 65. See Crum, supra note 61, at 260 (describing BIA actions to bring development to 
the Goshute reservation). 
 66. See id. at 261, 263–64 (regarding the BIA showing a declining amount of interest 
in the Goshute). 
 67. See Davies, supra note 3, at 303 (noting that, notwithstanding the ongoing efforts 
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World War II, the Skull Valley Goshute reservation had become 
"surrounded by chemical weapons, military testing facilities, and toxic 
waste."
68
   
When the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was appointed and began to meet 
with tribes to discuss the grant system, the Skull Valley Goshute decided to 
take part in the program.
69
  Mary Allen, a former vice chair of the tribe, 
explained that the MRS facility would help insure the future of her tribe.
70
  
The economic gain would enable the tribe to educate future generations 
about the history of the Goshute and would keep their culture alive.
71
  The 
tribe was granted the $100,000 Phase I grant, as well as the $200,000 Phase 
II-A grant.
72
  The tribe used the money to fund a five-year intensive study 
regarding the MRS process, how the waste was stored, and what the 
dangers were.
73
  Tribe members traveled to France, England, Sweden, and 
Japan to see MRS facilities currently in use.
74
  Further, one tribe member 
took a month-long internship at a nuclear power plant to learn more about 
the process of creating nuclear power and how the waste was stored.
75
 
The application deadline for the grant program had expired before the 
Goshute had finished their research and decided they wanted to build a 
MRS facility, but a consortium of eight electric utility companies 
approached the Goshute and began negotiations to build a private facility.
76
  
                                                                                                                 
by the BIA to advocate removal as late as 1942, the Goshutes prevailed and the BIA 
relented). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 332, 337 (describing decision by limited number of tribal members to 
seek grants from DOE, in contravention of traditional consensus-based governance among 
the Goshute). 
 70. See Private Fuel Storage, INTERIM STORAGE INC., 
http://www.interimstorageinc.com/private-fuel-storage (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (explaining 
rationale of developer seeking to store nuclear waste on Goshute lands) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 71. See generally id. (expressing view that the storage of nuclear waste would yield 
economic value for the Goshute). 
 72. Erickson et al., supra note 38, at 80–81. 
 73. Skull Valley: The Documentary: Interview with Leon Bear, KUED, 
http://www.kued.org/productions/skullvalley/documentary/interviews/bear.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 74. See id. (describing grants that the Goshute received from the Department of 
Energy and visits taken by Goshute tribe members to international nuclear facilities). 
 75. See Peter Ritter, Nuke ‘Em! Excel Energy Spearheads a High-Stakes Plan to Store 
Nuclear Waste on a Tiny, Dirt-Poor Indian Reservation in the Utah Desert, CITY PAGES 
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL (May 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.citypages.com/content/printVersion/14839 (providing an overview of the effort 
to store nuclear waste on the land of the Skull Valley Goshute) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 76. See Charles Seabrook, Utilities Offer Millions:  Poor Utah Tribe Gambles on 
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In May 1997, the Goshute signed a lease agreement with a corporate entity 
representing the consortium, and three days later the BIA conditionally 
signed off on the lease.
77
  The project would have provided an influx of 
money and created numerous jobs for members of the tribe; the lease would 
have provided the means to keep the Goshute tribe, and culture, alive.
78
 
The plan was not without opposition.
79
  Some tribe members believed 
a MRS facility would be too dangerous and were worried their land would 
be destroyed.
80
  Others felt tribal leadership was corrupt.
81
  The opposition 
continued to swell as tribe members accused Leon Bear, the tribal 
chairman, of silencing tribal members who opposed the waste plan and 
depriving them of project monies.
82
  Bear even cancelled several tribal 
chairman elections to ensure he remained in power.
83
  Soon Goshutes on 
other reservations, environmental justice advocates, churches, and other 
environmental groups joined in opposition against the proposal.
84
  Even the 
                                                                                                                 
Nuclear Waste, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 22, 2002, at 1A (noting that in 1993 the U.S. 
Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator lost its budget but that the Goshutes conducted 
further negotiations with Private Fuel Storage, the utility group). 
 77. See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record of Decision for the Construction and 
Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on the Reservation of 
the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians (Band) in Tooele County, Utah 4–5 (Sept. 7, 
2006) http://www.deq.utah.gov/issues/no_high_level_waste/index.htm (follow the link 
below "Documents") (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter ISFSI] ("In May 1997, the 
Band and PFS signed the First Amended and Restated Lease (‘first lease’) for the proposed 
ISFSI. . . .  On May 23, 1997, the Superintendent of the BIA Uintah and Ouray Agency . . .  
signed a ‘conditional approval’ of the first lease that would allow PFS to begin ISFSI 
construction . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment). 
 78. See Davies, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing the numerous potential benefits of the 
PFS project). 
 79. See id. at 335 (introducing a tribe member in opposition of the plan, Margene 
Bullcreek, who "was so strongly opposed that she formed a grass roots group . . . in an effort 
to put brakes on the plans"). 
 80. See id. at 335–36 (discussing the opinions of two tribe members, Bullcreek and 
Sammy Blackbear). 
 81. See id. at 336–37 (giving Blackbear’s opinion that the PFS plan would "corrupt[] 
tribal custom"). 
 82. See id. ("Some tribal members also alleged that Bear had shut out those members 
who disagreed with the waste plan, depriving them of project monies and a forum to be 
heard."); see also Judy Fahys, The High Price of Dissent, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 6, 2003, at 
B1 (giving examples of some problems experienced by some members of the opposition, 
with specific reference to how the Tribal Chairman, Leon Bear, was handling the situation). 
 83. See Davies, supra note 3, at 337 ("Bear’s term as chairman, in fact, was set to 
expire in 2004, but he canceled seven straight elections on the grounds of an insufficient 
quorum, thus keeping himself in power as acting chairman."); see also Deborah Bulkeley, 
Goshute Elections Are Contested, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov. 3, 2006, at B4 (discussing 
the contested elections that have taken place in an effort to keep current Chairman Leon 
Bear and his supporters in office). 
 84. See Davies, supra note 3, at 337–38 (introducing a number of people and groups 
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governor of Utah, Michael Leavitt, joined in opposition.
85
  However, due to 




The NRC completed an environmental impact statement
87
 that was 
reviewed by the BIA and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
88
  The 
environmental impact statement found that the project posed little threat to 
the safety of the Goshute and surrounding populations, and in the end the 
NRC approved the proposal.
89
  In March 2001, after hearing of the 
approval, the legislature of Utah passed, and Governor Leavitt signed, a 
number of bills that attempted to block nuclear waste from being brought 
into the state.
90
  The Goshute filed a federal lawsuit against the state, and 
the courts found that the bills were preempted by federal regulation.
91
 
After Leavitt’s defeat in federal court, Utah’s five-member 
congressional delegation began exerting political pressure to have the 
proposal denied.
92
  By December 2005, Senator Orrin Hatch had persuaded 
                                                                                                                 
who were also opposed to the PFS plan, including Bullcreek’s Ohngo Guadadeh Devia, the 
Confederated Goshute Tribe in Deep Creek, and Winona LaDuke, "a nationally known 
Native American and environmental justice advocate"). 
 85. See id. at 338 ("Utah’s governor at the time, Michael Leavitt, wanted to stop the 
Goshutes’ plan before it was even set."). 
 86. See id. at 338–39 (recognizing that the federal government, specifically the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, makes the ultimate decision regarding licensing this 
particular storage proposal). 
 87. The purpose of environmental impact statements is to evaluate the positive and 
negative effects a project will have on the landscape.  See National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f, 4332 (2000) (discussing a number of justifications 
for environmental impact statements). 
 88. See Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards, NRC, 1 NUREG-1714, Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation on the 
Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, iii (2001), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1714/v1/cover.pdf [hereinafter 
FEIS] (outlining the purpose of the environmental impact statement and which agencies 
must give approval to the PFS proposal for it to continue). 
 89. See id. at xxix–xxxii, available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr1714/v1/exec-summ.pdf (summarizing the PFS proposal to the 
four involved federal agencies:  the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Surface Transportation 
Board). 
 90. See Davies, supra note 3, at 340 ("By March 2001, Leavitt had delivered on his 
promise [to stop the Goshutes’ plan].  He signed into law a series of bills attempting to 
prevent the delivery of high-level nuclear waste into the state."). 
 91. See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1250 
(D. Utah 2002) (holding that Utah’s statutes at issue were preempted by the Atomic Energy 
Act), aff’d, Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 92. See Davies, supra note 3, at 341–43 (outlining some of the ways that Utah’s 
congressional delegation were able to use their political pressure to aid in stopping the PFS 
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the two biggest private investors in the consortium to back out of the deal.
93
  
Utah’s five-member congressional delegation believed that the proposed 
site’s proximity to an Air Force training base, coupled with the potential for 
terrorist attacks, made the nuclear waste facility too dangerous.
94
 
Undeterred, the NRC granted the consortium’s proposal for the nuclear 
waste site in September 2005.
95
  This victory, however, was short-lived.  In 
January 2006, "Utah Congressman Rob Bishop . . . succeeded in attaching 
to a defense spending bill a measure designating a vast expanse of federal 
land north of the Goshute reservation—over 100,000 acres—as a formal 
‘wilderness area.’"
96
  In essence, the defense spending bill created a land 
barrier around the Goshute, preventing the Goshute from using roadways 
and railways to transport waste to the waste facility.
97
  Thus, it did not 
matter whether the proposal for the storage facility had been granted, 
because the Goshute had no way to transport the waste to the facility.
98
  
Leavitt had failed in his attempt to block transportation corridors because of 
federal preemption, but the wilderness designation was federally mandated 
and could not be preempted.
99
  In September 2006, the BIA reversed its 
approval of the MRS facility on the Goshute reservation, citing their 
concern for the health and well-being of the Goshute.
100
  However, it was 
                                                                                                                 
plan). 
 93. See id. at 342 ("[T]wo of PFS’s biggest backers, the Southern Company and Xcel 
Energy, PFS’s majority stockholder, announced that they would no longer support the 
project."). 
 94. See Joe Bauman, Nuclear Storage Battle Fires Up, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 18, 2005, 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/600119494/Nuclear-storage-battle-fires-up.html?pg=1 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (commenting that "[m]any of the planes [from Hill Air Force 
Base] carry live ordnance, increasing the danger should an aircraft crash into the PFS 
facility") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 95. See Private Fuel Storage, 62 N.R.C. 403, 405 (2005) (denying the petition for 
review and authorizing "the NRC to issue a license to construct and operate the PFS 
facility"). 
 96. Davies, supra note 3, at 343; see also Utah National Guard Readiness Act, H.R. 
3651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008) (conveying approximately 431 acres of land adjacent to Camp 
Williams to Utah for the use of the Utah National Guard, with a specific provision included 
to financially penalize the state for storing hazardous materials on site). 
 97. See Davies, supra note 3, at 343 ("The wilderness designation built on an earlier 
effort by Governor Leavitt to erect a ‘land moat’ around the Goshutes.").  
 98. See id. ("The idea was simple:  [i]f the Goshutes could not use surrounding 
transportation corridors to move waste to the site, whether they had a storage license would 
be irrelevant."). 
 99. See id. (suggesting that the "wilderness effort" avoided the preemption problem 
encountered in the earlier proposed solution because it was enacted through a congressional 
mandate). 
 100. See ISFSI, supra note 77, at 19 ("Upon weighing the benefits to the Band against 
the significant uncertainties and other factors . . . we conclude that it is not consistent with 
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clear to all of those involved that the main reason for the BIA reversing 




The Goshute have not given up.  In July 2007 they sued the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, challenging the decision to deny the MRS 
facility.
102
  On July 26, 2010, the judge vacated the U.S. Department of the 
Interior’s decision to deny the Goshute permission to build the MRS facility 
and remanded the proposal back to the U.S. Department of the Interior for 
reconsideration.
103
  Even if the U.S. Department of the Interior allows the 
Goshute to build the facility, they will likely face strong opposition to their 
proposal, as evidenced in the tribe’s previous battles.  While the case 
continues to work its way through the courts, the bigger question is:  what 
happens to the Skull Valley Goshute now?  They still live on barren land 
surrounded by facilities such as chemical weapons plants, military testing 
grounds, and toxic waste.
104
  An MRS facility was a chance for the Goshute 
to infuse their tribe with the means to survive, but now constructing a 
nuclear waste facility is unlikely to happen.
105
  It is ironic that the trust 
doctrine, a mechanism used to insure the protection and survival of tribes, is 
what ultimately led to the denial of the proposal, a decision that could 
signal the end of the Skull Valley Goshute as a people, culture, and tribe. 
                                                                                                                 
the conduct expected of a prudent trustee to approve a proposed lease that promotes storing 
[spent nuclear fuel] on the reservation.").  The BIA said the EIS did not evaluate the impact 
on the tribe when the waste was actually removed from the MRS facility, there was no 
timetable for how long the waste would stay on the reservation, and there was no assurance 
of law enforcement on the reservation.  Id. at 20–25. 
 101. See Davies, supra note 3, at 344–45 ("[I]t . . . was plain that the decisions were 
based more heavily in politics than reasoned decisionmaking . . . ."). 
 102. See Amended Complaint at 2–3 Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Cason, 
(D. Utah July 20, 2007) (No. 2:07cv00526) 2007 WL 5354505 (outlining the plaintiff’s case 
and praying for relief in the form of one of the five potential outcomes set forth by the 
plaintiff’s complaint). 
 103. See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Davis, No. 07-cv-0526-DME-DON, 
2010 WL 2990781, at *12 (D. Utah July 26, 2010) (vacating the Department of the Interior’s 
Calvert and Cason Records on Decisions and remanding PFS’s right-of-way application 
back to that agency). 
 104. See Davies, supra note 3, at 303 (giving the history of the Goshute tribe, 
particularly with respect to their geographical location and its features). 
 105. See Press Release, Bob Bennett, U.S. Senator, Bennett Hails News that PFS Loses 
Final Push to Bring Nuclear Waste to Utah (Sept. 7, 2006),  
http://web.archive.org/web/20060923023130/bennett.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=26265
2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (announcing the denial of both PFS’s Bureau of Land 
Management application for a right-of-way for transporting high-level nuclear waste and 
their Bureau of Indian Affairs application a nuclear waste storage facility to be located on 
tribal lands) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
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This case study serves as an example of the legal barriers that Native 
American tribes face when they try to exercise their sovereign status.  
Moreover, the Goshute tribe’s story exemplifies the broader problem of 
state and federal governments stifling the economic opportunities of Native 
American tribes.  Although the Goshutes were able to overcome legal 
challenges from the state of Utah, their proposal for a nuclear waste facility 
was ultimately denied because the federal government used the Federal 
Trust Doctrine to overrule the power of the tribe’s sovereign status.  The 
first step in resolving the conflict between Native American sovereign 
status and the trust doctrine is to understand how the two powers were 
created and how courts interpret the two powers. 
 
III.  The Creation of Tribal Sovereignty and the Federal Trust Doctrine 
 
The interplay between Tribal sovereignty, State jurisdiction, and 
Federal jurisdiction are all important forces when nuclear waste siting is at 
issue.  Tribes contend that due to their sovereign status, they should be free 
to site nuclear waste on their land if they choose to do so.
106
  Federal 
government officials believe that, pursuant to the Trust Doctrine, they 
should be able to veto tribes who have decided to site nuclear waste on their 
land.
107
  Further, state officials believe that because nuclear waste must 
travel on their roadways and railways in order to reach MRS facilities on 
tribal land, they should also have the power to deny tribes the right to store 
nuclear waste on their land.
108
  Analyzing the history of each entity’s power 
is essential in sorting out whether tribes have an ultimate right to site 
nuclear waste on their land or if their sovereignty is controlled by federal or 
state jurisdictional powers. 
 
A.  Tribal Sovereignty 
 
Tribal sovereignty is not a power that was delegated by Congress; 
rather it is seen as a pre-existing power retained by the tribes.
109
  Tribal 
sovereignty is accepted as a form of international law, where the 
                                                 
 106. See Davies, supra note 3, at 334–35 ("[T]he [Goshute] tribe very much sees that 
sovereignty as bound up in their choice to accept nuclear waste."). 
 107. See id. at 308 ("At its most basic level, the trust doctrine is precisely what it 
implies, a duty of the federal government, acting as trustee, to protect a res, a tribal property 
interest that has been placed in trust for beneficiaries, namely, tribes and tribal members."). 
 108. See id. at 340–41 (outlining the ways that the Utah state government attempted to 
legislate to prevent the storage of nuclear waste within state boundaries, including 
preventing passage along the state’s roads and highways). 
 109. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 666 (recognizing that tribal power is "based on the 
concept of a pre-existing Native sovereignty"). 
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relationship of the federal government and tribes is analogous to a more 
powerful nation having dominance over a weaker one.
110
  While tribes are 
subject to the legislative authority of the federal government and can rely 
on the federal government for protection against states trying to exercise 
authority over them, tribes are otherwise independent.
111
  The wording of 
the United States Constitution in regard to Native Americans reflects the 
concept of treating tribes under international law.
112
  The Constitution states 
that Native Americans are not taxed, and the Indian Commerce Clause 
groups tribes with other sovereign entities when considering the extent of 
federal power to regulate tribal commerce.
113
  Both of these mandates 
recognize the sovereign status of tribes and their members.
114
   
The independent power of tribes was reinforced in early Supreme 
Court Cases.
115
  In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
116
 the Supreme Court held 
that the federal government had a general duty to protect Native American 
rights and compared the relationship of Native Americans and the federal 
government to that of a "ward to his guardian."
117
  Moreover, in Worcester 
v. Georgia,
118
 Chief Justice Marshall concluded that "a weaker power does 
not surrender its independence, its right to self-government, by associating 
with a stronger [power], and taking its protection."
119
  Therefore, tribal 
authority controls all internal self-governing matters, unless that power has 
been limited by federal plenary power or treaty.
120
 
                                                 
 110. See id. (discussing the source of tribal powers through international law concepts). 
 111. See id. (suggesting the relationship between Native tribes and the federal 
government is analogous to the dominance of a weaker nation by a stronger nation—tribes 
are independent aside from the necessity to yield to the laws of the dominant nation and a 
possible dependence on that nation for protection). 
 112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."). 
 113. See id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("[E]xcluding Indians not taxed . . . ."). 
 114. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 666 (recognizing that "[t]he two references to 
‘Indians’ in the Constitution indicate their status as independent sovereigns"). 
 115. See id. at 667 (introducing early instances where the Supreme Court acknowledged 
Indian tribes’ sovereign power). 
 116. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 59 (1831) (holding that the Supreme 
Court did not have original jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation because they are a 
dependent nation rather than a state or an independent nation). 
 117. See id. at 17 (suggesting that Indian nations are more akin to "domestic dependent 
nations" rather than "foreign nations"). 
 118. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (holding as unconstitutional a 
Georgia statute prohibiting non-Indians from visiting tribal lands without a permit from the 
state because the state had no authority over tribal affairs—that is the role of the federal 
government). 
 119. Id. at 560–61. 
 120. See id. at 561 (concluding that tribes can maintain their right to government and 
independent status while remaining under the protective powers of a "stronger" state). 
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B.  Federal Jurisdiction 
 
The decisions in early Supreme Court cases led to the adoption of the 
Federal Trust Doctrine.
121
  While scholars have struggled to define what the 
trust doctrine actually is, the Department of the Interior treats the doctrine 
as a symbol of the federal government’s duty to protect tribes, their land, 
and natural resources.
122
  In a narrow sense, the doctrine bestows a fiduciary 
responsibility on the federal government to protect tribes, but in a broader 
sense, the federal government has a moral obligation to protect tribes 
generally.
123
  This broad plenary power grants Congress almost completely 
unfettered power to pass legislation with respect to tribes.
124
 
Although federal agencies are not granted the same broad powers as 
Congress, some departments, like the BIA, have acted as if they had the 
same powers as Congress.
125
  The BIA operates under congressionally 
mandated authority and is charged with managing reservation land under 
the federal government’s designation as trustee.
126
  More specifically, the 
BIA monitors land development by controlling resource allocation, contract 
negotiation, and collecting royalties.
127
  Further, resource agreements and 
leases are subject to BIA approval, and the BIA can overrule tribal council 
decisions regarding use of tribal land.
128
 
In 1961, the beginning of the Self-Determination Era, the federal 
government began to lessen the amount of power departments like the BIA 
could exercise.
129
  The Self-Determination Era is characterized by the 
                                                 
 121. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 670 (introducing three U.S. Supreme Court cases, 
referred to as the "Marshall trilogy," which addressed the issue of Native sovereignty). 
 122. See GILBERT L. HALL, THE FEDERAL INDIAN-TRUST RELATIONSHIP 2 (1979) 
(defining the government’s responsibility "to protect valuable Indian lands, water minerals, 
and other natural resources") (internal quotations omitted). 
 123. See Davies, supra note 3, at 308–09 (defining, in both specific and broad terms, 
the obligation placed on the federal government by the trust doctrine). 
 124. See Jennifer Smith Haner, Tribal Solutions to On-Reservation Environmental 
Offenses:  Jurisdictional Parameters, Cultural Considerations, and Recommendations, 19 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105, 109 (1995) (identifying the predictable, preeminent power that the 
federal government holds over "both tribal and state claims of authority"). 
 125. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty:  
The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1478–80 (1994) (outlining the 
BIA’s role in managing the government’s duty to maintain federal Indian land). 
 126. See id. at 1478 (assigning the responsibility of managing the trust title vested in 
the government to the BIA). 
 127. See id. at 1478–89 (setting out the day-to-day supervisory for which the BIA is 
responsible). 
 128. See id. at 1479 (giving the BIA primary authority to review tribal decisions with 
regard to certain uses of their land). 
 129. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 672 (discussing steps taken by Congress and 
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federal government taking a more laissez-faire approach towards regulating 
Native American affairs,
130
 as well as recognizing tribes as capable local 
governments.
131
  Although President Lyndon Johnson, and later President 
Richard Nixon, advocated for increased tribal participation in developing 
federal programs for Native Americans,
132
 the advent of nuclear power 





C.  State Jurisdiction 
 
The preceding discussion regarding federal power over tribes shows 
the complexities involved in untangling tribes and the Federal Trust 
Doctrine.  Unfortunately, sorting out what powers States have over tribes is 
just as complicated.
134
  Different rules apply depending on whether Native 
or non-Natives are affected, whether Native-owned or non-Native-owned 
property is involved, and whether the case is civil, criminal, or 
regulatory.
135
  Basically, states are preempted from asserting authority over 
Natives on tribal lands when state action would interfere with federal or 
tribal interests.
136
  Conversely, states generally have authority to regulate 
the actions of non-Natives on tribal land.
137
 
States can gain civil and criminal jurisdiction over natives on tribal 
land through a grant by Congress.
138
  In regard to regulatory authority, state 
jurisdiction is based on a two-part test developed in two Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
federal agencies to loosen their grip over and promote autonomy within the tribes). 
 130. See id. (indicating the change in government oversight of the tribes to a "more 
laissez-faire policy toward tribal relations"). 
 131. See id. at 672–73 (detailing steps that the Environmental Protection Agency and 
BIA have taken to allow tribes the opportunity "to develop their own solid waste disposal 
programs . . . to make self-determination a reality").  
 132. See id. at 656 (analyzing executive policy during the "era of ‘Self 
Determination’"). 
 133. See supra notes 30–105 and accompanying text (describing the problems). 
 134. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 675 ("[T]he question of when state laws are 
enforceable on reservation land is a much more complex and uncertain inquiry."). 
 135. See Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation 
Environment:  Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 
WASH. L. REV. 581, 597 & 606–07 (1989) (comparing various legal and regulatory standards 
governing Natives and their land with those governing non-Natives and non-Native land). 
 136. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 676–79 (upholding the general principle set out in 
the Worcester decision that states may not exercise jurisdiction over Indian Country). 
 137. See id. at 679–80 (discussing states’ jurisdiction over non-Native Americans on 
reservations). 
 138. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (noting that acts of Congress 
may give states power over the Cherokee nation). 




  The Court in Williams v. Lee
140
 established the first part of the 
test, holding "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always 
been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation [Native 
Americans] to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
141
  However, the 
focus on infringement was deemphasized by the Court in McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Commission.
142
  The Court held the proper test was not 
only whether tribal custom or law preempted state involvement but whether 
a Congressional power or statute did as well.
143
  Following the shift to a 
preemption focus, a special preemption test was developed.
144
  The special 
preemption test is basically a balancing test, which weighs federal and tribal 
interests against a state’s interest in regulating an activity.
145
  The Supreme 
Court further defined the test in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe
146
 
by holding that state law is always preempted when it conflicts with federal 
and tribal interests, unless the state interest is sufficient to override federal 
or tribal authority.
147
  Thus, the special preemption test balances four 
factors:  tribal sovereignty, federal interests, tribal interests, and state 
interests.
148
  Tribal self-determination, economic development, and health 
and welfare are recognized as legitimate tribal and federal interests.
149
  
                                                 
 139. See Leonard, supra note 19, at 676–77 ("State jurisdiction is now based on a 
detailed factual analysis, structured around a two-part ‘preemption/infringement’ test, set out 
in two United States Supreme Court opinions."); see also Haner, supra note 124, at 115 
("State authority is determined by the application of a two-part test, the 
‘infringement/preemption’ test."). 
 140. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that allowing the state to 
exercise jurisdiction would undermine the authority of the tribal courts). 
 141. Id. at 220 (emphasis added). 
 142. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1973) (noting 
the power to tax reservation income is limited by treaty to the federal government and the 
tribal government). 
 143. See id. at 178–80 (rejecting the position that state action need only avoid 
infringing upon tribal self-government). 
 144. See Haner, supra note 124, at 115–16 (noting the Supreme Court’s preference for 
preemption over infringement). 
 145. See id. at 116 ("The Court balances tribal, federal, and state interests in regulating 
the activity, assessing the burdens and interests of each party."). 
 146. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 343–44 (1983) 
(holding that when the "exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the State would effectively 
nullify the Tribe’s unquestioned authority to regulate the use of its resources" and in "the 
absence of State interests which justify the assertion of concurrent authority," the Tribe’s 
interest is superior). 
 147. See id. at 334 ("State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it 
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless 
the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority."). 
 148. See Royster, supra note 135, at 644–49 (describing the component interests 
balanced in the preemption analysis).  
 149. See Haner, supra note 124, at 117–18 (describing specific tribal and federal 
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These interests must be balanced against a state’s interest in protecting its 
economy and environmental resources and ensuring tribes do not receive 




The Supreme Court held in Montana v. United States
151
 that states, not 
tribes, have jurisdiction over non-Native Americans on tribal land.
152
  
However, the Court held that one exception to this holding was that states 
have no jurisdiction where a non-Native American party has entered into a 
consensual agreement with a tribe or tribal members or in cases where tribal 
sovereignty interests are at issue.
153
  Thus, if a tribe entered an agreement 
with non-Native Americans to site nuclear waste on their tribal land, states 
would not have jurisdiction over the corporation, or any individuals of the 
corporation, constructing the waste facility or working at the waste facility.  
Although tribes have sovereignty and control all self-governing 
matters, it is clear that the federal government does have the ability to 
control Tribes’ actions using the Federal Trust Doctrine.
154
  Further, the 
courts have made it clear that, except in very limited circumstances, states 
cannot control what Tribes do on their land.
155
  However, as the Goshute 
tribe case study showed, the federal and state governments have still found 







                                                                                                                 
interests). 
 150. See id. at 118 (specifying relevant state interests to be balanced against tribal and 
federal interests). 
 151. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (holding that "exercise of 
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive 
without express congressional delegation"). 
 152. See id. at 565 (declaring that "Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent 
with their diminished status as sovereigns"). 
 153. See id. at 565–66 (reciting two retained inherent sovereign powers, one to regulate 
"activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe" and the other to 
"exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians . . . when that conduct threatens . . . 
the political integrity . . . of the tribe"). 
 154. See Davies, supra note 3, at 348 (noting that requiring federal approval for the 
leasing of tribal lands negates the possibility of actual sovereignty).  
 155. See Royster, supra note 135, at 604 (describing the circumstances permitting state 
jurisdiction over tribal lands). 
 156. See Davies, supra note 3, at 340–47 (chronicling the successful efforts by 
opponents to prevent construction of a MRS facility on Goshute lands).  
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IV.  The Federal Communications Commission and the Siting of Cell 
Towers 
 
While the conflict between Native American sovereignty and the trust 
doctrine is a complex issue, government agencies like the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) have been able to create a siting 
system for cellular towers that enables tribes the freedom to allow cellular 
towers to be sited on their land while still maintaining their full sovereign 
status.
157
  Therefore, because cell towers and nuclear waste facilities are so 
similar,
158
 delving into the history of the Federal Communications 
Commission and the history of their cell tower siting practices can 
illuminate solutions to the NRC’s nuclear waste siting problems.  
 
 
A.  How Cell Towers and Nuclear Waste Sites are Similar 
 
Cell towers and nuclear waste facilities are more similar than they 
might first appear.  Siting both types of facilities creates issues concerning 
the sacred nature of tribal land, technologies’ violation of nature, and safety 
concerns.
159
  Further, both the cellular and nuclear industries are continuing 




Many tribes believe it is their duty to protect their land and the 
environment.
161
  For them, the land is sacred and must be protected at all 
                                                 
 157. See FCC, NATIONWIDE PROGRAMMATIC AGREEMENT FOR REVIEW OF EFFECTS ON 
HISTORIC PROPERTIES FOR CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS, 12 (2004), available at 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/siting/npa/tribal.html (follow "Full Text PA (PDF)" hyperlink) 
(outlining procedures for siting cell phone towers and related communications respecting 
tribal sovereignty). 
 158.  See infra notes 159–191 and accompanying text (explaining the similarities 
between cell towers and nuclear waste facilities from a siting perspective). 
 159. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 (discussing the sacred nature of tribal land and 
technologies’ violation of nature); see also Cellular Phone Towers, AM. CANCER SOCIETY 
(Jan. 31, 2006) 
 http://www.cancer.org/docroot/PED/content/PED_1_3X_Cellular_Phone_Towers.asp (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2011) [hereinafter ACS] (discussing safety concerns) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 160. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing the mounting nuclear waste problem); 
see also Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, 
http://www.ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) 
[hereinafter CTIA] (showing the increased usage of cellular phones) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 161. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 (noting that Native Americans feel a protective 
duty for the land because it is sacred). 
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costs.
162
  The construction of nuclear waste facilities significantly alters the 
landscape,
163
 as do cell towers.
164
  The construction of both types of 




Some tribes believe that the creation of nuclear power violates 
nature.
166
  Their rationale is that the atomic forces involved are sacred and 
the act of splitting an atom harnesses a power fit for God, not humans.
167
  It 
follows that if the creation of nuclear power violates nature, constructing 
MRS facilities to store the nuclear waste would carry the same stigma.
168
  
While cellular technology does not involve the splitting of atoms, the 
process by which cell phones work is highly scientific,
169
 and conservative 




Storing and transporting nuclear waste does carry a stigma of causing 
environmental contamination,
171
 but the environmental impact statement 
filed by the NRC, BIA, and BLM in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute 
                                                 
 162. See id. (acknowledging the integral role of land in tribal culture). 
 163. See Cell Phone Tower Types and Information, STEEL IN THE AIR, INC., 
http://www.steelintheair.com/Cell-Phone-Tower.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (showing 
images of constructed cell phone towers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also New Nuclear Waste Site for Sydney, ABC 
NEWS (Sept. 22, 2008) http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/09/22/2370289.htm (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2011) (illustrating the massive space necessary to store nuclear waste) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 164. See Brian R. Manuel, Protecting Historic Landscapes Against the Proliferation of 
Cellular Towers, SJ053 ALI-ABA 307, 309 (2004) ("The effect of these modern day 
monoliths on the landscape is substantial . . . .").  
 165. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, SECTION 106 ARCHAEOLOGY 
GUIDANCE 20 (2009), available at http://www.achp.gov/archguide/ (follow the "PDF" 
hyperlink) (acknowledging the potential of construction projects to disturb archaeological 
sites, including those on tribal lands). 
 166. See WALLACE H. BLACK ELK & WILLIAM S. LYON, BLACK ELK:  THE SACRED 
WAYS OF A LAKOTA 37 (1990) (describing man’s creation of nuclear power as cosmic 
misbehavior). 
 167. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 ("[T]he atomic force that binds the nucleus 
together is a sacred force; splitting the atom and transmuting matter is viewed as an intrusion 
into the realm of God . . . ."). 
 168. See id. ("If nuclear power is viewed as a violation of nature, an MRS facility 
would likely carry this same sense of impropriety."). 
 169. See Manuel, supra note 164, at 309–11 (explaining the technical, scientific aspect 
of cell phone operation).  
 170. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 ("[T]ransmuting matter is viewed as an intrusion 
into the realm of God . . . ."). 
 171. See Collins, supra note 9, at 272–73 ("Fear of a nuclear accident dominates the 
thinking of nuclear opponents, who argue strongly that both use and disposal of nuclear 
materials are fraught with danger."). 
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determined that the construction and operation of the proposed nuclear 
waste facility would have little impact on the surrounding environment.
172
  
Further, the environmental impact statement found that potential for 
radiological harm to humans was very low.
173
  The same is true for cell 
towers.
174
  One of the largest environmental impacts caused by cell towers 
is on migratory birds, and the FCC is continuing to investigate how large 
the impact is.
175
  However, many people believe living in close proximity to 
cell towers causes cancer due to the radiofrequency energy waves traveling 
through the towers,
176
 although there has yet to be a conclusive study 
linking cell towers to cancer.
177
 
While nuclear waste is continuing to be stockpiled at nuclear power 
plants and nuclear weapon facilities,
178
 the cellular industry is booming.
179
  
The growth of these two industries means that solutions to our nuclear 
waste storage program and regulations for cell tower siting are two issues 
that continue to grow in importance.  Mounting stockpiles of nuclear waste 
will pose significant problems in the near future for the federal 
government.
180
  Stockpiles of nuclear waste and the cell phone industry are 
both entities that continue to grow.
181
  As more consumers switch from 
landlines to cellular phones,
182
 new cell towers are needed to improve 
technology and bear the burden of increased airwave traffic, but where can 
these cell towers be constructed?  Cell towers are aesthetically unpleasing 
and consumers worry the radiation from radiofrequencies increases cancer 
                                                 
 172. See Davies, supra note 3, at 339–40 (detailing the environmental impact 
statement’s conclusions regarding the risk of harm). 
 173. See id. at 340 (characterizing the danger of radiological harm as minimal). 
 174. See ACS, supra note 159 (stating that there is "very little" evidence of harm). 
 175. Catherine Wang, A Review of Wireless Developments:  Oct. 2003–Sept. 2004, 
813 PLI/PAT 103, 165–66 (2004). 
 176. See ACS, supra note 159 (stating that some people believe in a link between cell 
phone towers and cancer). 
 177. See id. (stating that most studies show no link between cell phone use and 
cancerous tumors). 
 178. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing nuclear power plants and nuclear 
weapon facilities). 
 179. See CTIA, supra note 160 (discussing the cellular industry). 
 180. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (stating that the American government has found 
no permanent solution to the stockpiling of nuclear waste). 
 181. See Davies, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing nuclear power plants and nuclear 
weapon facilities); CTIA, supra note 160 (discussing the cellular industry). 
 182. See Tim Barker, More People Drop Their Phone Landlines and Go Cell-only, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 10, 2008, http://www.allbusiness.com/media-
telecommunications/12004194-1.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (documenting increasing 
numbers of consumers switching from land lines to cell phones) (on file with the Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
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risks.
183
  Further, as new cell towers spring up around the country, they are 
encroaching on land owned by Native American tribes.
184
  In order for 
cellular companies to offer the type of service the public demands, they 
have to expand their network coverage, and that includes building cell 
towers on tribal land.
185
   
The FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934 (Act of 
1934).
186
  The main purpose of the Act of 1934 was to condense authority 
over the licensing of wire and radio communications to one federal 
agency.
187
  Therefore, because the FCC is responsible for the licensing of 
telecommunications activities, cellular tower siting is under their 
jurisdiction.
188
  The FCC has struggled at times to balance the public’s 
desire for better cell phone technology with the requirements set forth in the 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and some tribes’ desire to have 
their land, religion, and society respected.
189
  The NHPA makes the federal 
government responsible for protecting American history, archaeology, and 
                                                 
 183. See Manuel, supra note 164 (registering the complaints against cell phone towers 
as springing from their aesthetically displeasing nature); see also ACS, supra note 159 
(noting that some people worry about radiological harm from cell phone towers). 
 184. See Marcia Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites:  Federal Regulatory 
Responses to American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1645 
(2004) (noting several instances of cell phone towers being built around sites sacred to 
American Indians). 
 185. See Gregory A. Smith, The Role of Indian Tribes in Section 106 National Historic 
Preservation Act Review Process, SJ053 ALI-ABA 649, 652 (2004) (stating that tribes have 
received thousands of requests by service providers to build cell phone towers on tribal 
lands). 
 186. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended 
at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). 
 187. See Gary A. Lehman, New Wave Policy:  Protection of Direct Broadcast Satellite 
Transmissions Under Section 605, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 590, 594 (1984) (stating that the law's 
purpose was to centralize various federal agencies). 
 188. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., Selected Materials on Cellular Communication 
Towers and Historic Preservation, SG040 ALI-ABA 275, 295-296 (2001) [hereinafter Nat’l 
Trust for Historic Pres.] (stating that the FCC has regulatory powers over licensing 
telecommunications activities). 
 189. See FCC, Learning Interactive Unit:  Nationwide Programmatic Agreement, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/siting/npa/intro.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Learning 
Interactive Unit] (stating that tribes that do want cell towers on their land feel that cell tower 
construction companies have disrespected them by failing to treat them as sovereign nations) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see 
also National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No.89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq. (2000)) ("The Congress finds and declares that . . . 
historic properties significant to the Nation’s heritage are being lost or substantially 
altered . . . ."); see also Press Release, FCC, Wireless Telecomm. Bureau Announces 
Execution of Programmatic Agreement with Respect to Collocating Wireless Antennas on 
Existing Structures, 16 FCC REC. 5574 (2001) [hereinafter Collocation Agreement] (setting 
forth a series of operating principles agreed to by the FCC and historic preservation 
organizations). 
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culture from destruction and is triggered any time a project is determined to 
be a federal undertaking.
190
  A federal undertaking is defined as "a project, 
activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect 
jurisdiction of a federal agency," and because the FCC regulates the 
installation of all transmission frequencies, cell tower construction is 
considered a federal undertaking.
191
  Thus, when cellular towers are 
constructed, even on Native American land, a full NHPA review must be 
undertaken.  
 
B.  History of How Federal Laws Have Shaped Cell Tower Regulation 
 
Tribes are sometimes concerned that government projects, like cell 
towers, not only destroy their land, but also destroy their culture.
192
  These 
types of projects require facilities to be constructed on land that might 
contain artifacts and burials important to tribal culture.
193
  The federal 
government was aware of these concerns and thus included an important 
requirement in any review of a project under the NHPA.
194
   
This requirement is Section 106 of the NHPA, which makes the 
federal government responsible for "tak[ing] into account the 
effect . . . federal undertaking[s]" may have on historic properties.
195
  Once 
the NHPA is triggered, cell tower construction companies must complete a 
lengthy Section 106 review process before the project can commence.
196
  
The NHPA also created the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
(ACHP), an independent federal agency,
197
 charged with promoting the 
"preservation, enhancement, and productive use of our country’s historic 
                                                 
 190. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2000). 
 191. Id. at § 470w(7). 
 192. See Gowda, supra note 8, at 238 (writing that American Indians hold land to be 
integral to their cultural identity). 
 193. See id. (writing that American Indian cultural identity is intertwined with the land). 
 194. See Collocation Agreement, supra note 189 (noting the concerns of the tribes). 
 195. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (2000). 
 196. Id. The NHPA requires that:  
 
[The] federal agency must make a reasonable and good faith effort to identify 
historic properties, 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b); determine whether identified properties 
are eligible for listing on the National Register based on criteria in 36 C.F.R. § 
60.4; assess the effects of the undertaking on any eligible historic properties 
found, 36 C.F .R. §§ 800.4(c), 800.5, 800.9(a); determine whether the effect will 
be adverse, 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.5(c), 800.9(b); and avoid or mitigate any adverse 
effects, 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.8(e), 800.9(c).  
 
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir.1999).  
19716 U.S.C. § 470i(a) (2000). 
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resources."
198
  The ACHP reviews and comments on all federal projects that 
qualify under the NHPA prior to their implementation.
199
  The ACHP 
review process requires consultation with local State Historic Preservation 
Officers (SHPOs),
200
 as well as local Native American tribes that might be 
impacted.
201
  The ACHP ensures that cell tower construction companies 
have consulted with SHPOs and have followed the protocol laid out in the 
NHPA.  However, the FCC’s desire to improve cellular technology across 
the country has led to conflict with tribes and ultimately led to the FCC 




1.  The Conflict Between the FCC, Cellular Companies, and Tribes 
 
Although the Section 106 power is broad and far-reaching, the statute 
specifically protects tribes by ordering any federal agency to "consult with 
any [Native American] tribe . . . that attaches religious and cultural 
significance to [a piece of] propert[y]."
203
  This requirement was 
deemphasized in 1996, when Congress passed the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 (Act of 1996)
204
 to "accelerate rapid[] private sector deployment of 
advanced telecommunications and information technologies and 
services . . . by opening all telecommunications markets to competition."
205
  
In order to rapidly advance telecommunication and information 
technologies, the Act of 1996 put limitations on the zoning authority of 
local governments to deny applications for the construction of cell 
towers.
206
   
                                                 
 198. See THE NAT’L HISTORIC PRES. ACT, CONN. TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., 
http://www.cttrust.org/index.cgi/1047 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (detailing the history of the 
National Historic Preservation Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 199. See id. (detailing the review process set up by the National Historic Preservation 
Act). 
 200. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)(3)(I) (requiring SHPOs to consult with federal agencies in 
any federal undertaking that may affect historic properties). 
 201. See id. at § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2000) (requiring the ACHP to consult with Native 
American tribes when performing Section 106 reviews). 
 202. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (providing examples of the 
conflict). 
 203. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2000) (noting that Native Hawaiian groups must 
also be consulted with, when applicable). 
 204. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 205. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 
124. 
 206. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A)–(B) (2003) (limiting in certain situations the power 
of local authorities to reject applications for cell phone tower construction). 
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In line with the Act of 1996’s de-regulatory mandate, the FCC issued 
its own regulations to fulfill its responsibilities under Section 106 of the 
NHPA.
207
  The FCC’s regulations required the preparation of 
environmental assessments and environment impact statements, as well as 
coordination of Section 106 reviews.
208
  Under the new regulations, 
companies engaged in the construction of cellular towers were required to 
conduct environmental assessments for projects, which could affect the 
entities listed in the NHPA.
209
  After an environmental assessment is filed 
with the FCC, there is a thirty-day waiting period, and then the FCC either 
approves the construction or requests the preparation of an environmental 
impact statement to further review the effect the proposal will have on the 
environment or historic resources.
210
  However, because the FCC uses an 
honor system, in which the FCC relies on the cell tower construction 
company to identify historic properties that might be affected, without the 
input of the FCC or SHPOs, there is sometimes no oversight by the FCC.
211
  
Until 1999, this lack of oversight had allowed tens of thousands of cell 
towers to be built across the country without tribal consultation.
212
 
In 1999, the FCC adopted new rules to conform with Section 106 
regulations.
213
  The FCC’s new rules required cell tower construction 
companies to consult with SHPOs and tribes, a rule that restricted the de-
regulatory mandate of the Act of 1996.
214
  However, the FCC’s new rules 
opened the floodgates for Section 106 reviews for tribes and at SHPOs 
across the country.
215
  Tower construction companies flooded tribes with 
                                                 
 207. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1301–1.1319 (2009). 
 208. Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296.  The major differences 
between environmental assessments and environmental impact statements are that 
environmental assessments are the precursor to environmental impact statements.  JACOB I. 
BREGMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 24 (2d ed. 1999).  Environmental 
assessments do not require that public meetings are held about the proposed project; almost 
all the material used in the assessment is readily available, meaning no new material has 
been collected for the assessment.  Id.  Further, environmental assessments are not required 
to be published in the Federal Register.  Id.  Lastly, environmental assessments are 
completed much more quickly than the lengthy environment impact statement process.  Id.   
 209. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (noting the requirement 
of environmental assessments). 
 210. See id. (describing the notification  and approval procedure). 
 211. See id. (noting the lack of direct supervision). 
 212. See Smith, supra note 185, at 652 (noting that some of the tens of thousands of 
towers built across America were built on American Indian cultural land). 
 213. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (2000). 
 214. See id. (requiring the FCC to consult with certain groups before becoming 
involved in an undertaking). 
 215. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (recalling the thousands 
of requests SHPOs have received to approve cell phone tower construction). 
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requests for information about their land and often told the tribes if they did 
not hear back within thirty days, they would assume their project would not 
adversely affect tribal land.
216
  Problems were also created for SHPOs who 
were overwhelmed by requests for Section 106 reviews, some for towers 
that had already been built.
217
 
None of the parties involved with the process were satisfied, and all 
had specific complaints.
218
  Tower construction companies complained the 
review process took too long and worried that the regulations protected 
areas too strictly.
219
  SHPOs complained that because submissions from 
tower construction companies were not standardized, submissions varied to 
such a degree that review of them was sometimes impossible.
220
  Tribes 
complained that cell tower construction companies felt they should not have 
to compensate tribes for reviewing their applications.
221
  Tribes felt they 
should be compensated for providing their expertise in reviewing 
applications.
222
  Further, cell tower construction companies often failed to 
contact tribes before they began construction.
223
  Even when tower 
construction companies did contact tribes directly, they were violating the 
tribe’s right as a sovereign entity to consult with the FCC privately 







                                                 
 216. See Smith, supra note 185, at 653 (stating that certain letters from cell phone 
companies deeming a lack of objections on the tribe's part to be consent to build a cell phone 
tower). 
 217. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (noting the flood of 
Section 106 requests). 
 218. See Learning Interactive Unit, supra note 189 (noting the dissatisfaction amongst 
interested parties).  
 219. See id. (referring to complaints from cell phone companies). 
 220. See id. (recalling that submissions SHPOs received from tower construction 
companies, "varied in detail, format, and often were insufficient to perform a review"). 
 221. See Smith, supra note 185, at 653 ("[C]ell tower companies, which stand to make 
great profits from these towers, have with few exceptions, been unwilling to pay fees to 
cover tribal costs."). 
 222. See id. (noting the costs and "onerous workload" that tribes have in responding to 
cell phone tower location requests by cell phone companies).  
 223. See Learning Interactive Unit, supra note 189 ("[M]any Indian tribes reported 
tower constructors frequently failed to contact them prior to construction, which, 
unfortunately, on at least one occasion led to the destruction of a tribal sacred site."). 
 224. See Smith, supra note 185, at 653 (noting the tribes contention the cell phone 
companies, by directly contacting the tribes, have violated the tribes’ "sovereign right to 
consult" with the FCC). 
A MODEL FOR SITING NUCLEAR WASTE 81 
  
2.  The FCC’s Solution to Cell Tower Siting 
 
In order to address these issues, a "Working Group" was created 
composed of members from the FCC, ACHP, SHPOs, Native American 
tribes, the communications industry, and other historic preservation 
consultants.
225
  The Working Group wanted to ease the burdens of all 
parties involved in the cell tower siting process, and in March 2001, the 
Working Group released the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement For The 
Collocation of Wireless Antennas (Collocation Agreement).
226
  Collocation 
arises in a situation where a cell tower company is hired to place a new, or 
additional, antenna on a pre-existing tower, structure, or building.
227
  The 
benefit of the Collocation Agreement is that it enables cell tower companies 
to bypass the lengthy Section 106 review.
228
  However, the Collocation 
Agreement only applied to existing towers, so the Working Group 
developed another programmatic agreement in 2004:  The Nationwide 
Programmatic Agreement for Review of Effects on Historic Properties for 




The NPA makes the Section 106 process much easier for all parties 
involved in five specific ways.
230
  First, the NPA refines the process for 
identifying land or buildings that may be harmed in the construction 
process by requiring records kept at SHPO offices be reviewed.
231
  Second, 
the NPA "[e]xclud[es] certain categories of undertakings from review that 
                                                 
 225. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 296 (detailing the creation of 
a "working group" of interested parties). 
 226. Collocation Agreement, supra note 189. 
 227. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 297 (defining the term 
"collocation"). 
 228. See id. (detailing the four preconditions for bypassing Section 106 review).   
 229. Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the Section 106 Nat'l Historic 
Pres. Act Review Process, 20 FCC REC. 1073 app. B (2004) [hereinafter Nationwide 
Programmatic Agreement].  Two years before the NPA was released, the ACHP released a 
letter to the FCC stating that when, in the course of Section 106 review, a tribe fulfills the 
role of a consultant or contractor in regard to providing information, compensation for its 
expertise is appropriate; however, applicants are not required to pay a fee, but they are still 
responsible for obtaining the necessary information from the tribe.  John M. Fowler, Letter 
Relating to Payment of Fees in the Section 106 Review Process (Apr. 26, 2002), in THE 
COMPLETE NPA USER’S MANUAL:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE AND REFERENCE FOR THE 
NATIONWIDE PROGRAMMATIC AGREEMENT FOR SECTION 106 HISTORICAL PRESERVATION 
REVIEW OF THE UNDERTAKINGS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 327–28 
(John F. Clark ed., 2005) [hereinafter Fowler].   
 230. Learning Interactive Unit, supra note 189 ("The Nationwide Agreement improves 
the Section 106 process in five principal ways . . . ."). 
 231. Id. (noting that the first improvement is a "[r]efining [of] the process for 
identifying ‘eligible properties,’ by requiring the use of records in the SHPO offices"). 
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. . . are not likely to adversely effect historic properties."
232
  Third, 
procedures for contacting SHPOs were revamped to facilitate timely 
communication.
233
  Further, the NPA grants construction companies the 
ability to move forward with their project if the SHPO does not respond 
within thirty days.
234
  Fourth, the NPA requires the use of uniform forms 
when filing reports to SHPOs.
235
  Lastly, new guidelines were established 
for consulting with Native American tribes.
236
 
As part of the new guidelines, the FCC created an online database 
called the Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS).
237
  Native 
American tribes interested in siting cell towers on their land can upload 
information about their land, including what areas would be disturbed by 
tower construction, to help guide companies in selecting locations to build 
towers.
238
  Further, the system can alert tribes when construction companies 
have submitted proposals for towers that might affect them.
239
  By using the 
system, tribes can begin discussions with tower construction companies and 
                                                 
 232. Id. (detailing that the excluded categories of "undertakings include:  (a) 
Enhancements to towers; (b) Temporary Towers; (c) Replacement Towers; (d) Certain 
Towers Constructed in Industrial and Commercial Areas; (e) Certain towers constructed in 
Utility Corridor rights-of-way and (f) Towers constructed in SHPO/THPO designated 
areas"). 
 233. Id. (acknowledging the newly-established process by which to contact SHPOs). 
 234. Id. (stating that the process for contacting SHPOs now includes a "provision 
authorizing tower constructors to proceed with construction if a SHPO does not respond 
within thirty days").  
 235. Id. (noting the standard forms, called the submission packet). 
 236. See id. (mentioning that the final change is the advent of guidelines for "consulting 
with federally recognized Indian tribes and NHOs").  The new guidelines reinforced the 
regulations in place, requiring tower construction companies to contact and consult tribes 
when the project would affect areas tribes had an interest in.  Nationwide Programmatic 
Agreement, supra note 229, at 1149–54. 
 237. See Harry Martin, New Tower Notification System, RADIO MAG. (Apr. 1, 2004, 
12:00 PM), http://radiomagonline.com/fcc/radio_new_tower_notification/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2011) (announcing the new tower notification system) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 238. See FCC, TOWER CONSTRUCTION NOTIFICATION SYSTEM,  
http://wireless.fcc.gov/outreach/notification/TCNS_tribe.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter TCNS] ("[TCNS] provides a means for Tribes, NHOs, and SHPOs to respond 
directly to the companies if they have concerns about the proposed tower construction.") (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  Nearly 
600 Native American tribes have registered with the TCNS, including the Skull Valley 
Goshute.  FCC, TOWER CONSTRUCTION NOTIFICATION SYSTEM:  TRIBES,  
http://wireless.fcc.gov/outreach/index.htm?job=tower_notification (follow "Tribe/NHOs" 
hyperlink beneath "Log In" button) (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).   
 239. See TCNS, supra note 238 ("[The Tribe] may reply to a single notification [it has] 
received regarding proposed tower construction."). 
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their consultants more quickly.
240
  However, the TCNS is not a substitute 
for Section 106 review,
241
 nor does the system alleviate the FCC of its duty 
to consult with tribes on a government-to-government basis, because under 
the TCNS the FCC acts as a "middle man."
242
  Proposals for new towers get 
uploaded to the TCNS, and the FCC then forwards them to tribes who 
might be interested.
243
  The tribes then respond to the FCC and those 
messages are forwarded to the company who submitted the original 
proposal.
244
   
In 2006, the FCC unveiled the second generation TCNS.
245
  The new 
version of the TCNS included some improvements to further streamline the 
application process.
246
  The improvements for tribes included creating a 
"batch reply" function for tribes to respond to multiple proposals at once; an 
added language feature that enables tribes to create more detailed 
preferences for what projects they would allow; an automated response 
feature that enables tribes to send "canned" responses instead of 
individually replying to every proposal; and a map function for tribes to 
outline their geographic areas of interest in more detail.
247
  Once tribes have 
accepted the proposal and the Section 106 review has taken place, cell 
tower companies can negotiate terms of a lease and begin construction.
248
 
                                                 
 240. See id. ("By making themselves available to receive notification of proposed tower 
construction sites as early as possible, Tribes, NHOs, and SHPOs can increase their ability to 
engage tower constructors and their consultants at an early date."). 
 241. See id. ("We emphasize to system users that the TCNS is a tool to facilitate 
Section 106 Consultation. . . .  The system is NOT to be used as a substitute for Section 106 
Consultation."). 
 242. See id. ("The TCNS also enables the Commission to consult on a government-to-
government basis with federally-recognized Tribes at an early date."). 
 243. See Martin, supra note 237 ("The system streamlines the process, providing one-
stop shopping for tower proponents: They provide the FCC with the notification, and the 
Commission then handles the dissemination of that information to organizations that might 
be affected by the proposed construction."). 
 244. See id. ("Those entities may then submit responses back to the Commission, and 
the Commission will forward those responses back to the notifier."). 
 245. See Marvin Webster, FCC Announces "Second Generation" Enhancements to Its 
Tower Construction Notification System, ENVTL. CORP. OF AM., http://www.eca-
usa.com/files/ECA_TCNS_Enhance.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) ("The FCC’s public 
demonstration of recent enhancements to the TCNS was webcast March 30, 2006.") (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 246. See id. ("These changes, which incorporated a new Nationwide Programmatic 
Agreement (NPA) into the FCC environmental regulations, were designed to streamline 
environmental processing of new wireless telecommunications facilities."). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Nationwide Programmatic Agreement, supra note 229, at 1161 (stating that 
companies can proceed with the project after a determination of "no [h]istoric [p]roperties 
affected" or "no adverse effect"). 
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Since the Act of 1996, cell tower construction regulation has evolved 
almost perfectly to protect tribal lands and sovereignty.  Under the current 
Collocation Agreement and NPA, tribes are assured of being involved in 
the siting of cell towers on sites they have an interest in.
249
  Also, they can 
receive consultation fees from construction companies to ease the burden of 
reviewing applications, and lastly, the regulations in place protect the 
sovereign status of tribes and enable them to consult solely with the FCC if 
they choose.
250
  Due to the success of the cell tower siting practices by the 
FCC and the similarities between cell towers and nuclear waste storage 
facilities, the NRC should create a regulation system akin to the cellular 
tower siting system currently in use by the FCC, so tribes can have the 
option to site nuclear waste facilities on their land. 
V.  Creating a Siting System for Nuclear Waste Facilities 
Open discussions between federal agencies, tribal groups, SHPOs, and 
private contractors have helped the FCC create an ideal system for siting 
cellular towers.  This system enables tribes to retain their sovereign status, 
allows cellular companies to receive prompt feedback concerning tower 
proposals, and allows the FCC to satisfy all of the requirements set forth in 
the NHPA.
251
  The FCC’s handling of cellular tower regulation provides a 
template for how the NRC should create a siting system for nuclear waste 
facilities on Native American land. 
 
A.  Problems with how the Nuclear Waste Regulatory System Currently 
Functions 
 
Before a nuclear waste regulatory system like the TCNS can be 
created, jurisdictional issues must be resolved.  First, Courts must continue 
to rule that federal law preempts any state challenge to the construction of 
                                                 
 249. See Collocation Agreement, supra note 189, app. A, at 5576 (stating the 
Collocation Agreement does not preclude tribes from consulting with relevant parties when 
tower construction might affect significant properties); see also Nationwide Programmatic 
Agreement, supra note 229, app. B, at 1185–86 (recognizing the requirement for companies 
to consult with tribes in the tower construction process). 
 250. See Fowler, supra note 229, at 327 (discussing consultation fees); see also TCNS, 
supra note 238 (discussing regulations to protect a tribe’s sovereign status). 
 251. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (describing these benefits). 
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nuclear waste facilities on tribal lands.
252
  Second, Congress must address 




1.  Courts Must Continue to Rule that Federal Law Preempts State 
Challenges to Nuclear Waste Siting 
 
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
254
 states cannot reject the siting 
of nuclear waste on tribal land, although they can voice their opinion on the 
construction of a waste facility.
255
  Further, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
gave full responsibility to the federal government to dispose of, and 
regulate, nuclear waste.
256
  Therefore, states should be preempted from 
challenging proposed MRS sites on tribal land based on the power 
bestowed on the federal government in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 
While federal preemption can bar states from enacting legislation to 
prevent nuclear waste from entering their borders, tribes also rely on their 
sovereign status to protect their activities from attacks by states.
257
  The 
Supreme Court, however, has recently started to erode the power vested by 
sovereign status.
258
  The idea of Native American sovereignty has fallen 
into disfavor with the Supreme Court, and the concept of sovereignty has 
been replaced by an analysis of a tribe’s history and tradition of regulating 
the issue in question.
259
  The Supreme Court’s decision to focus on a tribe’s 
history and tradition of regulating an issue is problematic for deciding 
whether states can preempt a MRS facility because while tribes have no 
tradition of regulating nuclear waste, neither do states; the power to regulate 
waste resides solely with the federal government.
260
  Therefore, regardless 
                                                 
 252. See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1250 
(D. Utah 2002) (holding that the Atomic Energy Act preempts state law), aff’d, Skull Valley 
Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 253. Contra Davies, supra note 3, at 349 ("When the trust and sovereignty seek to 
coexist, neither thrives."). 
 254. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2006). 
 255. See id. § 10121 (allowing state participation and consultation in the nuclear waste 
siting process). 
 256. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4) (2006). 
 257. See Frank R. Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations:  Hope for the Future?, 36 
S.D. L. REV. 239, 250 (1991) (recognizing the "apparent strength of independent tribal 
sovereignty as its own barrier to state authority"). 
 258. See id. at 252 (stating that Supreme Court legislation has abandoned the 
infringement and preemption tests created in past cases). 
 259. See Collins, supra note 9, at 341 ("A relatively recent line of cases seems to 
indicate that in certain areas, the Supreme Court is willing to let states interfere when the 
tribes have no ‘tradition’ of regulation in the field at issue."). 
 260. See id. at 342–43 ("The federal government has long held the exclusive right to 
regulate nuclear waste safety; neither tribe nor state, therefore, has a history of regulation in 
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of tribal sovereignty, if the government grants tribes the right to store 
nuclear waste, states have no standing to block nuclear waste from entering 




2.  The Conflict Between the Trust Doctrine and Tribal Sovereignty Must 
Be Resolved 
 
The second major issue involves trying to reconcile tribal sovereignty 
and the Federal Trust Doctrine.
262
  In order for tribes to be able to site 
nuclear waste facilities on their land, they must be able to exercise the 
freedom afforded them by their sovereign status, without the federal 
government using the trust doctrine to block the siting of nuclear waste 
facilities.  Tribes gain their power from sovereignty, which allows for self-
governance and self-determination, while the trust is required to use its 
power to make tribes submit to the federal government in order to protect 
them.  The problems created when tribal sovereignty and the trust doctrine 
intersect were on display in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute.
263
  The 
Goshute negotiated a lease with a private group to construct a MRS facility 
on their land.
264
  This act was consistent with the sovereign powers tribes 
historically enjoyed.  However, the BIA stepped in and vetoed the proposal 
because they felt the tribe’s future was at risk.
265
  The BIA’s actions are a 
prime example of the trust overpowering sovereignty.  The Goshute case 
shows that as the trust doctrine and tribal sovereignty currently function, 
they cannot coexist.  One must dominate the other.   
A new model for how tribal sovereignty and the Federal Trust 
Doctrine interact is essential to resolve this conflict in order to prevent the 
situation the Goshute faced from occurring again.  Commentators have 
proposed models across a wide spectrum, from nullifying the trust doctrine 
in favor of tribal sovereignty to rejecting the idea of tribal sovereignty 
                                                                                                                 
this area."). 
 261. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that states may 
not restrict movement of waste within its boundaries when the law is not directed toward 
"legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental"). 
 262. See Davies, supra note 3, at 328 ("The shape of tribal survival very much depends 
on how the law reconciles a rule that at its core gives the federal government authority over 
tribes as their purported protector—the trust—and another that seeks to allow tribes to mark 
their own path—sovereignty."). 
 263. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (discussing the Skull Valley 
Goshute’s interactions with the federal government in deciding whether to site a nuclear 
waste facility on the tribe’s land). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See ISFSI, supra note 77, at 29 ("[U]ncertainty concerning when the SNF might 
leave trust land, combined with the Secretary’s practical inability to remove or compel its 
removal once deposited on the reservation, counsel disapproval of the proposed lease."). 
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entirely.  Professor Mary Christina Wood has proposed a model that 
resolves the trust-sovereignty conflict by using the trust to ensure sovereign 
power.
266
  Wood argues that the trust doctrine must protect four areas 
essential to a tribe’s survival:  the tribe’s land base, the tribe’s economy, the 
tribe’s right to self-government, and the tribe’s culture.
267
  Wood’s model 
protects these four areas by requiring agencies to review how proposed 
projects would affect these four areas,
268
 and requiring courts to create a test 
to determine whether a federal action interferes with these four areas.
269
  
However, this model appears flawed because it does not resolve the trust-
sovereignty conflict, it simply has the trust prevail over sovereignty.  
Further, if the trust doctrine is protecting a tribe’s land, economy, and 
culture, the federal government may decide that those areas are at risk from 
nuclear waste facilities and thus deny any proposals.  If Wood’s model was 
adopted during the Goshute’s struggle to site a MRS facility on their land, it 
seems likely the outcome would have been the same. 
Professor Stacy Leeds has taken the opposite approach from Wood and 
argues that sovereignty should always prevail over the trust.
270
  For 
sovereignty to overpower the trust, Leeds argues that title to Native 
American lands must be conveyed to tribes,
271
 federal law must be changed 
to completely preempt state challenges to tribal actions on tribal land,
272
 
                                                 
 266. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New 
Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. 
REV. 109, 231 (1995) ("[C]ourts should devise a substantive test to prioritize native property 
and treaty resources in conflict situations involving threats from offreservation conduct . . . .  
The substantive fiduciary test must be strict in order to adequately protect native interests."). 
 267. See id. at 113 ("[F]our ‘attributes of sovereignty’ . . . are necessary to native 
separatism and warrant protection as beneficiary interests under the trust doctrine:  (1) a 
stable, separate land base; (2) a viable tribal economy; (3) self-government; and (4) cultural 
vitality."). 
 268. See id. at 225 ("The procedural mandate [of the trust doctrine] requires an agency 
to consider these effects of its actions on tribal property or other interests and assess its trust 
obligation towards the tribe.  The substantive mandate requires the agency to affirmatively 
protect the tribe’s interests when it undertakes action."). 
 269. See id. at 223 ("[C]ourts should exercise independent scrutiny in determining 
whether the proposed federal action interferes with . . . the . . . attributes of native 
sovereignty."); see also id. at 231 ("[C]ourts should devise a substantive test . . . ."). 
 270. See Stacy L. Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal Autonomy over Lands and 
Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 455 (2006) ("I set forth a proposal for a 
gradual end to federal supervision of Indian lands and a termination of the federal trusteeship 
in favor of exclusive tribal autonomy."). 
 271. See id. at 456 ("In order to restore tribal autonomy, . . . [t]he first step is 
conveyance of fee title from the federal government to the tribal government or the Indian 
allottee."). 
 272. See id. at 457 ("To protect against state interference and preserve tribal autonomy, 
the conveyances of fee title would need to be accompanied by changes in federal law."). 
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and tribes must be allowed to decide if they desire federal supervision or if 
the tribe wants to be completely autonomous.
273
   
While Leeds’s proposal would ensure that tribes could site nuclear 
waste facilities on their land without intervention from states or the federal 
government, the proposal is still fraught with problems.  First, if tribes are 
given full sovereignty power, they could make decisions that lead to a 
backlash from the rest of society.
274
  For example, if the Goshute had built a 
nuclear waste facility without input from states or the federal government, 
the entire state of Utah, and surrounding states, would have had to cope 
with the nuclear waste being transported on public roadways.  The safety of 
millions of people would have been put at risk to benefit a small population 
of Native Americans.  Second, if tribes are given full sovereignty and 
choose not to have any federal supervision, they run the risk of losing their 
land entirely.
275
  For example, tribes could sell off almost all of their land or 
tribes could enter ventures that permanently contaminate the land, making it 
uninhabitable.  Tribes suffer from extreme poverty,
276
 so it is possible that 
tribes will make a detrimental decision regarding a venture because they 
have no other means to produce income.  For any perceived negatives 
associated with the trust doctrine, one of the benefits of the doctrine is that 
it has always preserved land for tribes to live on.
277
  Lastly, full tribal 
sovereignty could silence internal dissent within tribes.
278
  With no federal 
influence, leaders may become corrupt and silence any internal critics.
279
 
Commentators like Reid Peyton Chambers have proposed a middle 
ground, where neither the trust nor sovereignty rule over the other.
280
  
                                                 
 273. See id. at 458 ("[F]or those tribes that choose to act as their own trustee over tribal 
resources, the tribe will make the determination of whether its lands may be otherwise 
encumbered as a matter of tribal law."). 
 274. See Davies, supra note 3, at 358 ("[T]he exercise of tribal sovereignty may visit 
externalities on other parts of society . . . .  Where such externalities exist, tribal sovereignty 
risks inciting backlash from mainstream society . . . ."). 
 275. See id. at 360 ("[C]ourts have relied on the trust as a way to protect tribal lands 
from state jurisdiction and taxation . . . .  [I]f those barriers to assimilation are 
removed . . . tribes will vanish one by one."). 
 276. See id. at 298 (asserting that poverty among the Skull Valley Band of Goshute 
Indians is greater than three times the national average). 
 277. See id. at 360 ("[P]erhaps the trust’s biggest benefit is that, through its prohibition 
on the alienation of tribal lands, the trust has helped preserve a space in which tribes can be 
sovereign.").  
 278. See id. at 363 ("A final pitfall [of full sovereignty] is the risk that turning tribal 
decisions entirely over to tribes will silence internal dissent."). 
 279. See id. (noting the concern that "removing federal oversight will lend itself to 
increased leadership corruption"). 
 280. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with 
Self-Determination of Indian Tribes:  Reflections on Development of the Federal Trust 
Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 2005 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13A (Sept. 27, 
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Chambers’s proposal allows tribes to bypass federal authority when 
entering into short-term land leases lasting up to thirty years, but requires 
federal approval for leases lasting longer than thirty years.
281
  Also, 
Chambers suggests the trust be used to judicially enforce a limitation on 
congressional power, so the power of sovereignty cannot be lessened or 
changed by Congress.
282
  However, this model does not resolve the trust-
sovereignty power struggle.  Chambers’s proposal gives sovereignty more 
power for any endeavor lasting up to thirty years, but switches power back 
to the trust for an endeavor lasting longer than thirty years.
283
  Therefore, 
the trust and sovereignty still conflict at the thirty-year mark.
284
 
The Wood, Leeds, and Chambers models do not resolve the trust-
sovereignty issue; instead the models shift power from one side to the 
other.
285
  However, Lincoln Davies has proposed a model that ignores 
balancing the trust and sovereignty and instead bases the model on three 
pillars essential for guaranteeing tribes sovereign status:  full tribal self-
determination, externality moderations, and sovereignty protection.
286
  
Davies argues that the purpose of this model is not to give tribes supreme 
power to overrule other jurisdictions; rather the model makes tribes 
powerful enough to stand on equal footing with states, putting tribes in a 
more powerful position for negotiations with other jurisdictions than they 
currently are.
287
    
Full tribal self-determination would give tribes the option to attain the 
same levels of governmental power and responsibility that states enjoy.  
Under Davies’s model, treating tribes as states gives the tribes more power, 
                                                                                                                 
2005) (discussing the consistency between the federal trust doctrine and tribal self-
sovereignty) [hereinafter Chambers]. 
 281. See id. at 13A-37 (discussing the approval requirements for longer term leases); 
see also Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty:  Secretarial 
Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1084 (1974) (discussing 
abolishing federal approval for short-term leases) [hereinafter Chambers & Price]. 
 282. See Chambers, supra note 280, at 13A-41 ("[T]he question arises as to how the 
trust responsibility can be better enforced. . . .  [A] possible improvement could come from 
increased use of the trust responsibility to enforce limitation upon congressional power."). 
 283. See Chambers & Price, supra note 281, at 1084 (discussing situations in which 
Congress authorized tribes to lease lands for up to 30 years without approval). 
 284. See Davies, supra note 3, at 355 ("The two doctrines would still conflict . . . at 
thirty years instead of zero."). 
 285. See id. at 353–55 (assert that Wood’s model promotes the trust doctrine over 
sovereignty, that Chambers' model simply changes the time at which sovereignty and the 
trust doctrine conflict, and that Leeds’s model elevates sovereignty over the trust doctrine). 
 286. See id. at 365 (discussing Davies’s proposed "three pillars . . . around which a new 
model of greater sovereignty may be formed"). 
 287. See id. at 374 (asserting that the proposed model would enable the Goshutes to 
"ensure that they have the right to deal with [other] jurisdictions on a true government-to-
government basis"). 
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but also the responsibility for using that power in an appropriate manner.
288
  
The most obvious example of Native Americans not having full self-
determination was in the case of the Skull Valley Goshute.
289
  Because the 
Goshute lacked full tribal self-determination, the federal government 
essentially took away the Goshute’s most valuable resource, their land.
290
  
Without the ability to lease their land to be used for the storage of nuclear 
waste, the government took away an opportunity for the Goshute’s to revive 
their tribe’s economy.
291
  Further, when tribes try to expand their sovereign 
authority by acquiring additional land, the tribes submit to a slow, costly, 
and complex BIA-administered process.
292
  Moreover, the federal 
government has final approval of many tribal constitutions and elections, 
thus infringing on tribal sovereignty further.
293
  All of this governmental 
oversight has led tribes to believe they cannot really do anything without 
the federal government approving their actions.
294
  States, in contrast, are 
not subject to any of these rules and regulations.
295
  Under Davies’s model, 
if tribes attain the same self-determination as states, they would control 
taxing, policing, and zoning power over their land.
296
  Further, tribes could 
exit the "boiler-plate" constitutions they entered in to under the IRA and 
would be free to adopt constitutions tailored to their local circumstances 
and traditions.
297
  The ability to create an independent form of government 
is at the heart of full tribal self-determination.
298
 
                                                 
 288. See id. at 367–68 ("Under my model, treating tribes as states not only importantly 
expands what powers tribes may have, but gives them ultimate responsibility for carrying 
them out."). 
 289. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text; see Davies, supra note 3, at 368 
(stating that the Skull Valley Goshute provide the "most obvious" example of the issues that 
arise with tribes not having true self-determination). 
 290. See Davies, supra note 3, at 368 ("Continuing federal oversight of tribal land 
leasing drags down the value of tribes’ most valuable resource, [their land]."). 
 291. See id. ("Continuing federal oversight of tribal land . . . run[s] the risk of thwarting 
a tribe’s ability to revitalize, as the Goshutes’ believed nuclear storage would help them 
do."). 
 292. See id. ("[T]ribes wishing to make additional lands subject to their sovereign 
authority must submit to a complex BIA-administered process—one that has been criticized 
as too slow, too costly, and too loathe to expand tribal jurisdiction."). 
 293. See id. ("[M]any tribal constitutions and elections currently operate under federal 
approval and oversight."). 
 294. See id. ("Such pervasive federal involvement . . . has created the perception ‘on the 
reservation . . . that the Indians may not do anything unless it is specifically permitted by the 
government.’" (quoting Warren H. Cohen & Philip J. Mause, Note, The Indian:  The 
Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818, 1820 (1968))). 
 295. See id. ("By contrast, states have each of these [sovereign] powers by definition."). 
 296. See id. at 369 ("[T]ribes could use the model to exercise full zoning, police, and 
tax powers over the breadth of their reservations, just as states do within their territories."). 
 297. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 
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Externality moderation is the force that would restrain a tribe’s full 
self-determination.
299
  However, externality moderation is not analogous to 
the trust doctrine; instead externality moderation is included to 
acknowledge that every action by a sovereign entity can cause a reaction 
from another entity.  Therefore, externality moderation mitigates the 
harm.
300
  Currently, tribes have no say when the federal government 
exercises its plenary power, but externality moderation would put a halt to 
Congress’s and the Courts’ ability to weaken tribal sovereignty and create a 
system of rules and regulations that tribes would follow to gain such 
protection.
301
  One challenge to this model is in determining what 
constitutes an externality, and in turn, which federal laws tribes must 
submit to in order to assure full sovereignty.
302
  The outcome may be that if 
a tribe desired the full sovereign status enjoyed by states, they would have 
to submit to all of the federal-state relations outlined in the Constitution.
303
  
Tribes may see the adoption of externality moderation as the erosion of 
their nation-like sovereignty, but seeing how their sovereignty has 
constantly been attacked by Congress and the Courts, tribes may view 
accepting externality moderation as favorable.
304
  Two safeguards would 
                                                                                                                 
U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2000)) (providing restrictions on Native Americans’ ability to develop 
their own constitutions and bylaws); see also Davies, supra note 3, at 369 ("With this 
authority, tribes might also seek to break free from the prescriptive model of the Indian 
Reorganization Act-based constitutions and tune, just as states do, their governance systems 
to better reflect their own local circumstances and tribal traditions."). 
 298. See Davies, supra note 3, at 369 ("[U]ltimately this is the core of what true tribal 
self-determination must be about in the new model:  tribes’ right to implement any mode of 
government—whether modeled on the federal form or on native tradition, whether consistent 
with their existing constitutions or different from them—without . . .  federal meddling."). 
 299. See id. at 370 ("Mitigating externalities is the expectation that in order to exercise 
greater sovereignty, tribes may need to submit to restraints on their power addressing these 
harms."). 
 300. See id. ("[A]cceptance [to restraints on power] must not be seen . . . as 
perpetuating a federal trust obligation . . . .  Rather, its inclusion . . . acknowledges that 
because the actions of every sovereign entity in this country can affect the others, there is a 
need to moderate such harms in an evenhanded and fair way."). 
 301. See id. ("[W]hile today the plenary power limits tribal authority without tribal 
consent, the new model would use externality moderation . . . to abolish Congress’s and 
courts’ right to unilaterally diminish tribal sovereignty, and  . . . to explicitly set forth the 
conditions tribes must choose to accede in order to obtain such a strong protection."). 
 302. See id. ("Undoubtedly, a challenging facet here will be determining what 
constitutes a tribal externality, and thus, what aspects of federal law tribes must submit to in 
order to receive the model’s greater guarantee of sovereignty."). 
 303. See id. at 371 (discussing Constitutional regulations with which tribes may be 
required to comply in order to receive full sovereignty under the model).  For example, if a 
tribe wanted full authority to buy, sell, or zone their reservation land, externality moderation 
might require the tribe to submit to Fifth Amendment power.  Id. at 370. 
 304. See supra notes 109–156 and accompanying text (discussing how sovereignty has 
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prevent externality moderation from becoming analogous to the Federal 
Trust Doctrine.
305
  First, there must be a clear division between the power 
bestowed on the tribe and the restrictions placed on them, and second, the 
restrictions placed on tribes must be the same type that states submit to in 
exchange for sovereign power.
306
 
Ensuring the protection of sovereignty is an obvious goal for any 
model, but two questions remain:  how to define the area of protection, and 
how the protection should be implemented.
307
  The answer to the first 
question is rather straightforward.
308
  The area to be protected should be a 
tribe’s sovereignty over the land of their reservation.
309
  The reasoning is 
three-fold:  protecting a tribe’s reservation land would not require any 
changes be made to the existing land, states already enjoy this type of 
sovereign protection, and protecting tribes’ land allows tribes to exercise 




There are three suggestions regarding the implementation of 
sovereignty protection.
311
  First, the government could allow flexible 
treaties that allow tribes to negotiate the level of sovereignty they desire.
312
  
                                                                                                                 
been attacked by Congress and the Courts); see also Davies, supra note 3, at 371–72 
("[S]ome tribes might see . . . moderation as a dilution of their historical 
sovereignty . . . .  Others, . . . [s]eeing the United States’ inconsistent diminishment of tribal 
sovereignty in the past, . . . may view the trade of moderation for protection as favorable."). 
 305. See Davies, supra note 3, at 372 (suggesting that if the new model does not 
provide certain assurances, "the condition of externality moderation would not be 
moderation at all, but simply the trust by another name"). 
 306. See id. ("[I]mplementation of the new model must be careful in ensuring . . . that 
there is a clear nexus between the power the tribe is assured and the restriction it accepts 
and . . . that the restriction . . . is only a uniform requirement . . . to which all states must 
submit."). 
 307. See id. ("[T]he need for the final pillar of sovereignty protection should go without 
saying. . . .  The two critical questions are:  How should the area of protection be defined, 
and how should the protection be implemented?"). 
 308. See id. ("The analogy of tribes to states should provide a straightforward answer to 
the first question."). 
 309. See id. ("Traditionally, tribes were seen as having sovereignty within their 
territories; that territory remains essential to their sovereignty today; and thus, tribal 
sovereignty should be protected within the boundaries of tribal reservations."). 
 310. See id. at 372–73 ("It requires no manipulation of the existing landscape.  It is the 
same kind of sovereignty protection that states have.  And it would allow for tribes either to 
continue the same level of sovereignty they now exercise, or to exercise more 
jurisdiction . . . ."). 
 311. See id. at 373 ("As to the second question—how to implement this sovereign 
protection—there are a number of options."). 
 312. See id. ("[T]he government could void its ban on tribal treaties and create a pro 
forma treaty that would guarantee a minimum level of sovereignty for all tribes, but could be 
modified in particular circumstances via negotiation."). 
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Negotiation may not be the best option because the resources expended 
during the process could be enormous if every tribe enters in to separate 
negotiations with the government.
313
  Second, the option for sovereignty 
protection could be installed as federal law.
314
  This option is risky because 
it could allow a subsequent legislature to completely annul the sovereign 
protection; however, this option would create a better system of sovereignty 
than is currently enjoyed by tribes.
315
  Lastly, provisions could be added to 
the Federal Constitution to guarantee tribes sovereignty and conditions for 
opting in to the protection.
316
  Amending the Constitution is the most 
difficult option to implement based on how difficult it is to make 
amendments to the Constitution and the possibility that states may feel 
tribes are being provided a special status.
317
  However, it is the most 
powerful and optimal solution based on its permanency, and for those 
reasons should at least be attempted.
318
 
It is impossible to say if the Skull Valley Goshute would have been 
successful in siting their MRS facility even if they had been able to fully 
adopt this proposed model.  The BIA would have been unable to deny the 
proposal between the Goshute and the MRS consortium, but the Goshute 
would not have been protected from Congress creating a wilderness area 
and thus blocking the avenues for nuclear waste to be delivered to the 
reservation.
319
  Therefore, while the first step in allowing tribes to build 
nuclear waste facilities on their reservation is giving tribes full self-
determination and sovereignty protection, the second step is creating a new 
regulation system so tribes do not face attacks from surrounding states and 
federal legislatures. 
 
                                                 
 313. See id. ("The negotiation path would consume enormous resources if conducted 
tribe-by-tribe . . . ."). 
 314. See id. ("Another option would be to install the protection as a matter of law."). 
 315. See id. ("The codification avenue risks complete annulment by a subsequent 
legislature—especially in the absence of a meaningful judicial restraint that the trust has for 
centuries failed to provide—though this approach would be a substantial improvement on 
the existing status quo."). 
 316. See id. ("The most protective [option] would be to add to the Federal Constitution 
provisions guaranteeing tribes their sovereignty and defining the terms and conditions by 
which they may opt into that protection."). 
 317. See id. (asserting that the constitutional option’s "obstacle is that any constitutional 
amendment is difficult to achieve today.  When the amendment is one that some might . . . 
attempt to characterize as providing ‘special’ status to tribes, its success likely would be 
even more difficult to broker . . . ."). 
 318. See id. ("The constitutional possibility is the most promising and most 
admirable."). 
 319. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (discussing the BIA’s rejection of 
the Goshute’s proposal to build a nuclear waste facility on Goshute land).  
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B.  Proposal for a New Nuclear Waste Siting System 
 
The main issue with setting up a regulation system to allow Native 
Americans to enter into  negotiations to site a nuclear waste facility on their 
land is creating a system that enables tribes to preserve their sovereign 
status through negotiations with private construction companies.  The 
solution to this issue lies in the procedures for cell tower siting.  There are 
many similarities between nuclear waste facilities and cellular towers,
320
 
and both are types of facilities that Native Americans are faced with 
constructing on their land.  Whereas siting nuclear waste facilities has been 
a complete failure so far, siting cellular towers has steadily progressed due 
to regulations implemented by the FCC.
321
  Just as the FCC is charged with 
regulating the licensing of wireless facilities,
322
 the NRC is responsible for 
the regulation of nuclear waste and should therefore be charged with 
creating a siting system.
323
  The system should start with an online database 
much like the one created for the TCNS.
324
 
For tribes, the system can work in two different ways.  First, tribes 
could upload geographic and topographic information into the database 
making this information viewable by private construction companies 
looking to build nuclear waste facilities.  If a private construction company 
identifies a tribe they are interested in negotiating with, the company can 
either contact the tribe directly through the system, or, if tribes want to 
maintain their sovereign rights to communicate government-to-government, 
the company could contact the NRC, which would in turn contact the tribe 
directly.  The other option would have construction companies identify 
geographic regions they are interested in, and the system could then send 
notices to tribes in those geographic areas.  Once the notice is received, 
tribes could respond directly to the construction company, or through the 
NRC, stating whether they were interested in the proposal. 
                                                 
 320. See supra notes 159–191 and accompanying text (noting the similarities between 
cell towers and nuclear waste sites). 
 321. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC’s solution 
for cell tower siting).  
 322. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, I §1 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)) (granting the FCC authority to regulate the licensing of 
wireless facilities); see also Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., supra note 188, at 295 ("The 
Federal Communications Commission is the agency responsible for licensing 
telecommunication activities in the United States."). 
 323. See 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1974) (discussing the government’s objectives with respect 
to nuclear energy sources). 
 324. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (discussing the TCNS online 
database).   
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If tribes are interested in the proposal, they could move on to the next 
phase.  The next phase would include filing appropriate environmental 
impact statements with the NRC, as well as going through a Section 106 
review.  Further, all proposals would include protocol for procedures in the 
event of an accident.  The NRC, as the regulating and licensing body, 
should be in charge of creating these procedures.
325
  If the NRC accepts the 
proposal, final lease terms could be negotiated between the tribe and 
construction company.  The NRC should still serve their regulatory 
function and inspect the facilities on a yearly basis to determine if both 
parties are adhering to the lease terms. 
Assuming tribes are given full self-determination and sovereignty 
protection, states and the BIA would not be in a position to block the 
construction.  Further, because of the yearly inspections by the NRC, and 
assuming the environmental impact statements found low potential risk of 
harm, Congress would be less likely to oppose the project.  Moreover, with 
the discontinuation of the Yucca Mountain program, Congress should be 
more willing to construct MRS facilities, which seem to be one option 
currently available.
326
  It is clear the waste needs to go somewhere, and if 
tribes are willing to shoulder the burden, they should be allowed the 
opportunity to pursue these projects. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Even though the amount of nuclear waste continues to increase in the 
United States, the federal government has not been able to find suitable 
means for safely, and permanently, storing the waste.
327
  One possibility for 
siting our country’s nuclear waste involves having Native American tribes, 
like the Skull Valley Goshute, build nuclear waste facilities on their tribal 
land.  However, these proposals have met fierce opposition, both politically 
and legally.
328
  The Skull Valley Goshute case reveals that at the heart of 
the debate regarding nuclear waste siting on tribal land is the issue of how 
                                                 
 325. Procedures should include what to do if the MRS facilities fail and land is 
contaminated, if trucks carrying nuclear waste to the site are involved in accidents and 
nuclear waste is spilled in surrounding areas, and what penalties should be levied if terms of 
the agreement are not followed. 
 326. See Mountain of Trouble, supra note 1 ("Now that the Yucca Mountain project is 
dead the obvious question is:  Now what? As a senator in 2007, Mr. Obama 
suggested . . . ‘finding another state willing to serve as a permanent national 
repository . . . .’"). 
 327. See supra notes 30–55 and accompanying text (discussing the federal 
government’s attempts at siting nuclear waste facilities). 
 328. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text (discussing the Skull Valley 
Goshute tribe’s efforts to obtain a nuclear waste facility). 
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to resolve the conflict between the Federal Trust Doctrine and Native 
American sovereign status, a conflict with deep historical roots.
329
  To 
resolve this conflict, tribes must be guaranteed sovereign status through full 




Once Native American sovereign status is guaranteed, the federal 
government can consider how facilities like cellular towers have been sited, 
and implement a nuclear waste siting system akin to the FCC’s TCNS.  Part 
of the reason the TCNS has been so successful is because government 
organizations, tribes, and cellular tower construction companies all voiced 
their opinions on how a cellular tower siting system should work.
331
  The 
FCC was able to take the opinions of the parties involved and create a siting 
system that fully respects tribal sovereignty while shortening the review 
process for cellular tower construction companies.
332
  The goals of any 
nuclear waste storage siting system should be to allow tribes to enter into 
financially beneficial nuclear waste siting contracts as sovereign entities.   
Nuclear waste carries an intense stigma that is extremely difficult to 
overcome.
333
  However, the safe disposal of nuclear waste is an issue that 
cannot and will not disappear.  No one wants a nuclear waste facility sited 
in their backyard, but the reality is the waste has to go somewhere, and 
therefore when a city, state, or tribal group makes the determination to bear 
the load, the states and government should help tribes do it in the safest way 
possible, instead of trying to block the project through protests and 
legislation. 
 
                                                 
 329. Id. 
 330. See supra notes 251–326 and accompanying text (outlining a model aimed at 
resolving issues faced in the construction of nuclear waste facilities on Native American 
land). 
 331. See supra notes 225–250 and accompanying text (discussing the communication 
between tribes, cellular tower construction companies, and government entities). 
 332. Id. 
 333. See Collins, supra note 9, at 272–73 (discussing the public perception of nuclear 
power and nuclear waste). 
